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James W Fox Jr.
INTRODUCTION
Relational contract theory has done much to re-center our un-
derstanding of contract and contract law. Most contracts case-
books now include materials on long-term contracting and the
variations in "standard" contract law necessitated by these rela-
tions.' As Professor Robert Scott recently said, "[w]e are all rela-
tionalists now. Yet even with the improved understanding of
contract behavior and contract law fostered by relational contract
theory, the many versions of the theory have not provided an ade-
quate normative understanding of the state's role in contract law.
While relational contract theorists discuss the possible legal
changes suggested by relational contract issues, each approach -
whether based on Ian Macneil's foundational relational contract
theory or on a law-and-economics or communitarian variant -
contains at best a thin theory of the state and its connections to
contract law. These theorists have difficulty discussing and ex-
plaining state impositions on contract law and contract relations,
such as those based on the prevention of gender and racial dis-
crimination and those which view work and employment as a non-
t Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. Copyright © 2003 James W.
Fox Jr. All rights reserved. I thank my colleagues Marleen O'Conner, Mike Swygert, Jack
Graves, and Bob Batey, who read early drafts. I owe very special thanks to Ian MacNeil, who
provided very thoughtful comments and enabled me to grasp more fully my own theory, and to
Stewart Macaulay for his generous comments. I also thank my research assistants, Ian Clarke
and Monet Fauntleroy. Finally, Stetson generously supported my research through the Stetson
University College of Law Research Grant Program.
I See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 604-63
(6th ed. 2001 ) (discussing filling "gaps" in contracts, good faith and best efforts principles, and
trade usage and course of performance issues); id. at 253 (discussing Charles Goetz and Robert
Scott's study of relational contracts); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 494-509 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining trade usage and course of
performance in long-term contracts); id. at 520-28 (addressing supplier contracts and reasonable
notice for termination); id. at 541-56 (examining good faith in output/requirements contracts);
id. at 255 (discussing Stewart Macaulay's studies of business relationships); id. at 1083-84
(discussing Ian Macneil's work).
2 Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
847, 852 (2000).
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contractual aspect of citizenship and self-actualization, even when
the theorists might be sympathetic to these principles.
This Article explores the role of the state from the view of re-
lational contract theory. In particular, I argue that one can under-
stand the democratic state as itself a relation, but one outside of,
and parallel to, the relations understood by relational contract the-
ory. The state is a super-relation which mediates among other re-
lations, using law as a mediating instrument. Ultimately, I argue
that while relational contract theory helps us understand contract
and also helps us focus on the relational aspect of democratic citi-
zenship, democratic theory and not contract theory, even of the
broadly relational kind, is necessary to provide the basis for state
legal activity in many of the most important areas of contract rela-
tions and disputes.
In addition to providing a theoretical framework for under-
standing the connections between actions of the state and relational
contract theory, it is my hope that this Article can reinvigorate an
often neglected aspect of contract law: the role of contract law in a
democratic society. As George Priest observed several years ago,
Friedrich Kessler once taught contracts as a course in law, capital-
ism, and democracy: "Kessler saw the reform of contract law as
essential to the preservation of capitalism and democracy, to the
control of industrial empires, and to the protection of the citizen-
consumer." 3  Such concerns with democracy were once more
common in contracts scholarship, particularly in the halcyon days
of consumer law and political liberalism. 4 By contrast, contempo-
rary contracts courses and contracts scholarship focus on how
courts can improve risk allocation, provide effective default rules,
and otherwise assist the efficient regulation of private transac-
tions.5 While these are valuable topics and goals, the absence of
significant discussion, in classes and law journals, of the relation-
ship between the democratic state and its contract law leaves us
without the full depth of discourse available for contract law. This
result is especially unfortunate since contract law and contract ide-
ology were so critical in the framing of the early modern political
conception of the United States and its law during the Reconstruc-
tion Era of the 1860s and 1870s. It is an underlying assumption of
this Article that contract and democracy in fact have a lot to say to
George L. Priest, Contracts Then and Now: An Appreciation of Friedrich Kessler, 104
YALE L.J. 2145, 2150-51 (1995).
4 See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (discussing the intersection between
consumer law and contracts); see infra Part I.B.
- See Priest, supra note 3, at 2145.
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each other, and that the complexity of the connections between
American democratic ideals and American contract ideology can
provide rich soil for thinking about contract law.
This Article begins in Part I with a description of relational
contract theory and its variants. While I discuss several versions
of relational contract theory, I focus predominantly on Ian
Macneil's theory since he is the most widely recognized theoreti-
cian, as well as the "founder," of relational contract theory as a
distinct study. Part I then critiques relational contract theory for
being overly descriptive in its approach and for not providing a
sufficient normative basis for being able to analyze the actions of
the democratic state. This Part ends with the suggestion that if one
takes the basic idea of relational theory and recognizes the democ-
ratic state as itself a relation, one can begin to reassemble the con-
nections between contract and democracy.
In Part II, I begin exploring these connections with a brief
look at one of the formative eras for the study of contract and de-
mocracy. The authors of American Reconstruction were steeped
in a contract ideology and faith in contract; they were also deter-
mined to create a new, post-slavery, democratic state. This epi-
sode provides some clues about the possible interrelations between
contract and democratic citizenship, and how this connection can
break down. Part III sets forth the theory of democratic citizenship
as applied to relational contract theory. Here I locate the connec-
tion between Michael Walzer's theory of a plurality of values in a
democracy and Ian Macneil's relational contract theory. I then
flesh out some of the connections with an analysis of a few areas
of law (anti-discrimination, labor) for which democratic citizen-
ship theories can provide superior normative principles. In Part
IV, I suggest ways in which the two theories overlap and assist
each other, paying particular attention to problems of consumer
form contracting. This Article concludes by noting the caution
necessary for this project, a caution based in part on Ian Macneil's
important concerns about bureaucracy and jurisprudential ideal-
ism.
I. RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
A. What Is Relational Contract Theory?
Like so much of legal theory, there are almost as many defini-
tions of relational contract theory as there are scholars discussing
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it. There is law-and-economics based relational contract theory,6
Ian Macneil's foundational relational contract theory 7 and its
6 See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Robert A. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commer-
cial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990) [hereinafter Default Rules for Commercial Con-
tracts]. It is a bit misleading to characterize all relational contracts scholarship that is based at
least in part on economic analysis as part of law and economics. Much of this scholarship in
fact challenges some assumptions of the more traditional, or first generation, law-and-
economics approach; some of this scholarship, such as the work of Robert Scott (including the
seminal article he coauthored with Charles Goetz, above), may be better described as part of the
transaction-cost school of law and economics. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction
Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). Some
of this work can also be described as within the related area of social norms scholarship. See,
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant
Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry];
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225
(1998). However, as I am categorizing in broad swaths, these approaches do have an important
family resemblance.
7 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CON-
TRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT]; Ian R. Macneil,
Reflections on Relational Contract Theory After a Neo-classical Seminar, in IMPLICIT DIMEN-
SIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 207 (David
Campbell et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Macneil, Reflections]; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Con-
tract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil,
Challenges and Queries]; Ian R. Macneil, Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract Theory, 9
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 431 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracting Worlds]; Ian R. Macneil,
Political Exchange as Relational Contract, in GENERALIZED POLITICAL EXCHANGE:
ANTAGONISTIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATED POLICY CIRCUITS 151 (Bernd Marin ed., 1990)
[hereinafter Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE]; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as
Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987) [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociol-
ogy]; Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS
567 (1986) [hereinafter Macneil, Exchange Revisited]; Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 483 [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Con-
tract]; Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5
(1984) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracts of Adhesion]; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Inter-
nal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]; Ian
R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a
"Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Macneil, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Contractual Relations]; Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter Macneil, Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations]; Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L REV. 691 (1974) [hereinafter Macneil,
Many Futures]. For a full bibliography of Macneil's work through 2001, see THE RELATIONAL
THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 387, 387-90 (David Campbell ed.,
2001) [hereinafter SELECTED WORKS].
For other work on relational contract theory influenced by Macneil, see SELECTED
WORKS, supra, at 3-4; Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange,
46 BUFF. L. REV. 763 (1998); Matthew Lees, Contract, Conscience, Communitarian Conspira-
cies and Confucius: Normativism Through the Looking Glass of Relational Contract Theory, 25
MELB. U. L. REV. 83 (2001). Richard Speidel has also done extensive work developing the
particular connections between relational contract theories and contract doctrine, especially
[Vol. 54:1
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cousin law-and-society relational contract theory,8 libertarian rela-
tional contract theory, 9 and liberal communitarian relational con-
tract theory.' ° Despite their diversity, these approaches to contract
law share at least one important characteristic: they emphasize the
social and interpersonal relationships between the parties to the
contract and not simply the contractual agreement of those parties.
In particular, relational contract theories present important re-
visions to the standard perspective on contract law as studied in
most first-year contracts courses for much of the last two genera-
tions. "Taught" contract law has been based on some variant of
what contracts scholars call neoclassical contract law. Neoclassi-
cal contract law, as embodied in the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts, in the main treatises on contracts," and to some degree in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, takes as its model
transaction the isolated, or discrete, event between two relatively
equally situated, arms-length bargainers, engaged with each other
for the sole purpose of the contractual exchange and expressing
their complete contractual obligations in their mutual promises.
Thus the "contract" is defined through the offer and acceptance
rubric, where all the parties' obligations are objectified in the
stated agreement. This model has its roots in classical contract
law, most commonly associated with the grand treatises and schol-
regarding Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The
Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 254 (1995); Richard Speidel, Article 2 and
Relational Sales Contracts, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 789 (1993) [hereinafter Speidel, Relational
Sales Contracts]; Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Con-
tracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823 (2000) [hereinafter Speidel, Characteristics and Challenges];
Richard Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
1 See Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of
Contract, I I LAW & SOCY REV. 507 (1977) [hereinafter Macaulay, Elegant Models]; Stewart
Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465; Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations]; Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on
a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 775 (2000) [hereinafter Macaulay, Floating]; Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterward: Tapping the
Promise of Relational Contract Theory - "Real" Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 909 (2000).
9 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique oflan Macneil's Relational
Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1992).
() See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Con-
tract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990) [hereinafter Braucher, Regulatory Role]; Jay
M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 43 (1993) [here-
inafter Feinman, Default Rules]; Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 737 (2000) [hereinafter Feinman, Theory in Context].
11 See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(4th ed. 1998); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2001).
12 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17-70 (1979); FARNSWORTH,
supra note I1, at 109-222.
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arship of Samuel Williston, 3 which sought to objectify and for-
malize contract law through a series of universally applicable legal
rules.' 4 Modern contract law is called neoclassical, however, for
several reasons: First, although it retains the fundamental structure
of classical contract law, it incorporates some non-classic ele-
ments, such as the doctrine of unconscionability, the duty of good
faith, trade usage, and the increased use of reliance as a basis for
liability. 5  Second, where classical contract law was rule-based,
neoclassical contract law is more willing to adopt standards. 6
Third, neoclassical contract law disclaims the broad scope of clas-
sical law by carving out areas of complex contract relations, such
as labor law.' 7 In its attention to standard-based legal analysis and
contextual doctrines of good faith and unconscionability, neoclas-
sical contract law, as developed by legal realists such as Arthur
Corbin and Karl Llewellyn, shifted the focus of some contract law
beyond the discrete bargain to include the pre-contractual and
post-contractual interactions, as well as the trade and custom con-
texts of commercial contracts.
Despite this expansion of classical contract law to include
these broader concepts, relationalists still argue that neoclassical
contract law persists in defining contract primarily as the discrete
bargain centered on an exchange of promises. According to the
common view, contract law is about promises and their enforce-
ment.' 8 Good faith and unconscionability exist mainly on the pe-
riphery, to be brought in when the more classical doctrines fail. 19
Relational contract theorists often view the classical approach
as other-worldly and its neoclassical offspring as a form of extra-
terrestrial visitation.20  Beginning in the 1960s, scholars, influ-
enced by the realists, began exploring what in fact was going on in
the world of contracting, or contracts-in-action. The answer, based
'3 See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (4th ed.
West Group 2001) (1920).
4 See Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note 10, at 738-39.
15 Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 7, at 496-98.
I6 Jay Feinman points to the difference between the First and Second Restatements of
Contracts in how they approach the determination of the materiality of a breach to make this
point. See Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note 10, at 739.
17 Id. at 738-39.
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
"9 Macneil highlights the comments to U.C.C. § 2-302 on unconscionability to make this
point: "The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." MACNEIL, NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 86 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1).
2( For Macneil's critique of neoclassical contract law, see, e.g., Macneil, Adjustments of
Long-Term Economic Relations, supra note 7, at 883-86.
[Vol. 54:1I
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on empirical work such as that done by Stewart Macaulay 21 and the
theoretical work of the "creator" of relational contract theory, Ian
Macneil, 22 was that contract law - classical and neoclassical -
bears little relationship to what people actually do. Relationalists
argued that many contracts are part of a longer term and deeper
interpersonal relationship than contract law could imagine.23 For
example, the franchise relationship and the manufacturer-
distributor relationship, while clearly contractual, cannot be re-
duced to the initial written or oral contract. Even the terms of
those contracts often require an open-endedness that accounts for
flexibility over time in fundamental terms, such as price and quan-
tity. These relationships also produce their own "rules" which are
independent of, and often contradictory to, contract law. 24 For in-
stance, Macaulay discovered that suppliers would consider the
buyers' canceling of an order not as a breach (even though a
breach it was according to contract doctrine), but just something
that the buyer often had to do - if done in good faith - and to
which the supplier would adjust without contract dispute. 25 Rela-
tionalists such as Macneil also began emphasizing how contracts
were embedded social practices existing in a context of norms in-
dependent of the parties' promises and agreements.26
Here we come to the beginnings of the differentiations among
relational contract theories. Relational contract can be understood
21 See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 8; see also Gidon Gottlieb,
Relationalism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1983) (describ-
ing the law from the relational perspective).
22 See sources cited supra note 7. Macneil now prefers that his theory be called "essential
contract theory" in part to distinguish it from other less expansive (and often economics-based)
relational contract theories that do not focus on the essentials of exchange relations. Macneil,
Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 432.
23 "Neoclassical contract law is founded in theory and organization on the discrete trans-
action, but with many a relational concession. It can often deal adequately with the more dis-
crete issues in contractual relations. But when discrete and relational principles conflict, neo-
classical law lacks any overriding relational foundation, and thus lacks a resource often needed
in relational law." Macneil, New Social Contract, supra note 7, at 72. Paul Gudel describes
neoclassical doctrines such as good faith as simply an "attempt to force relational wine into
discrete bottles... " Gudel, supra note 7, at 770; see also Gottlieb, supra note 2 1.
24 Long-term contracting arrangements are the focus of relational contracts scholars of all
camps. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966) (focusing on an empirical ap-
proach); Goetz & Scott, supra note 6 (discussing economics-based theory, focusing on the
manufacturer-distributor model).
25 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 8, at 61.
26 See Gudel, supra note 7, at 769-70 (comparing a neoclassical, promise-centered view of
contract with Macneil's more contextual and norm-based approach); see also Braucher, Regula-
tory Role, supra note 10, at 702 (arguing that, under relational theory, "contractual relations...
are embedded in and defined by social context"); id. at 711 ("In a relational approach to con-
tract, interpretation and supplying terms both require investigation of the norms of the relation-
ship and of the social context.").
2003]
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in both a narrow and a broad sense. Narrowly it encompasses
those contracts in which the parties plan a long-term relationship:
requirement and output contracts, franchise agreements, some em-
ployment contracts, and marriage. 27 This narrow approach consid-
ers aspects of the longer term relations that affect how the parties
contract, what the terms of contract are and can be, how they are
interpreted, and what other "norms" govern the relationship out-
28side of the legally recognized contract. To this extent, the legal
principles of the realists, particularly those implemented in the
U.C.C. such as good faith,29 open-price terms,3° the flexibility ac-
corded output and requirements contracts, 31 and the attempt to find
a contract where the parties' expressions of offer and acceptance
contradicted each other but their actions show an agreement to
32proceed, are the focus of scholarly attention and the model for
further expansion of "relational" principles to non-sales long-term
contracts. 33  This narrow understanding of relational contracts re-
mains relatively consistent with neoclassical contract principles,
27 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 6; Schwartz, supra note 6; Scott & Scott, supra
note 6.
28 The relational approach that I describe as "narrow" comes close to what Alan Schwartz
described as "internal." In Schwartz's terminology, internal relational approaches focus on the
norms internal to the particular relationship. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 275; see also Gillian
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 927 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modem Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. I. My category of "narrow" would include such
approaches, but I mean to emphasize the frequent limitation of such analysis to particular types
of transactions and relations; some versions of what I call "narrow" relational approaches will
take into account norms from trade practices and the like. I do not adopt Schwartz's contrasting
category of "external" relational approaches, which Schwartz describes as focusing on societal
norms of fairness, justice, etc. (although my own approach might fit into this category).
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 275. Schwartz himself recognizes the limits of such a category be-
cause he sees Ian Macneil, who is after all the main proponent of a broader relational theory, as
advocating analysis of both "internal" and "external" relational norms. Id. I view the category
of "broad" relational theory as accounting for more broadly social and political norms although
not always to norms of fairness or similar general principles. Furthermore, I contend that one
cannot really talk about a single, internal relationship; so-called "external" norms arise from
overlapping relationships and cannot easily be reduced to a single category. One could even ask
the Macneilian question of whether "internal" norms are ever created in isolation from "exter-
nal" norms and social constructs. Schwartz is somewhat sensitive to these problems, and his
article provides an excellent analysis of how "internal" approaches to contract relations often
"collapse" into either external or law-and-economics approaches. Id. at 275-78.
29 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
30 U.C.C. § 2-305 (1977).
31 U.C.C. § 2-306 (1977).
32 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977).
33 E.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 6. Much of this work focuses on how courts can fill the
gaps in incomplete contracts. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 6. As Jay Feinman points out, the
more narrow view of relational contract tends to dominate American contracts scholarship. Jay
Feinman, The Reception of Ian Macneil's Work on Contract in the USA, in SELECTED WORKS,
supra note 7, at 59, 60-61, 64. For a relational analysis of Article 2 of the U.C.C., see Speidel,
Relational Sales Contracts, supra note 7.
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although it seeks to center relational principles that are often pe-
ripheral. It is an approach most commonly associated with the
transaction-cost school of law and economics 34 and with social
norms scholarship.
35
But the deeper challenge of relational contract theory, and the
primary insight of its main theorist Ian Macneil, is that all con-
tracts are relational.36 Contract is always a social act involving
multiple layers of relationships. As Paul Gudel has observed, this
insight is based on an assumption about human nature profoundly
different than the utility-maximizing, individualist assumptions of
many contract theorists, especially those schooled in law and eco-
nomics. 37  Contract, according to Macneil, highlights the funda-
mental contradiction in human existence: "Man is both an entirely
selfish and an entirely social creature, in that man puts the interests
of his fellow ahead of his own interests at the same time that he
puts his own interests first.,,38  For Macneil, contract can only be
understood as a complex interaction between self-interest and so-
'1 For a brief description of this school and its connection with relational contracts theory,
see Gudel, supra note 7, at 775-76. Gudel cites as a representative work from this school
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983). For other related works by Robert Scott,
see also Scott, Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, supra note 6, at 600 (discussing the
proper choice for default rules under a relational theory); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory
of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 903 (1986) (analyzing aspects of secured fi-
nancing under relational theory).
35 Lisa Bernstein's work is one of the foremost examples of social norms scholarship ap-
plied to contract law. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 6. More generally appli-
cable social norms scholarship is far too rich to cite adequately here. For a few representative
works encompassing a range of approaches, see, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational Choice Theories of
Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1 (2002). The seminal work for
legal scholars is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991). See also the articles in two excellent symposia: Symposium, Law, Econom-
ics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000).
36 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 344; SELECTED WORKS, supra note 7, at
5. Macneil defines "contract" as "exchange relations." Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra
note 7, at 878. Because I view Macneil's theory as presenting the greatest challenge, and be-
cause I see it as the one most closely addressing the questions of the role of the state, I concen-
trate much of my analysis on his approach.
17 Gudel, supra note 7, at 776.
38 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 348. For a more extensive discussion of
Macneil's recognition of this inherent human contradiction, see SELECTED WORKS, supra note
7, at 46-58. Macneil also makes the important point that in the real world of people who are
both selfish and social, there are no utility maximizers, as neoclassical economists might sup-
pose, but rather utility enhancers "immersed in relations creating countless countermotives."
Macneil, Exchange Revisited, supra note 7, at 577.
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cial solidarity. 39 Moreover, according to Macneil, this duality ex-
ists in all contracts. 40 The most discrete contract, such as the pur-
chase of gas on the turnpike (to use Macneil's famous example), 4'
assumes social customs and rules (money, language) and depends
on each person's connections to third parties (suppliers of gas,
governmental regulators). Thus Macneil-influenced scholars argue
for a much broader approach to the study of contract, one often
42based on sociology, social psychology, and other social sciences.
Of course this broad definition needs more precision to avoid
being over-inclusive to the point of meaninglessness. We still
want to be able to talk productively about distinctions among dif-
ferent types of contracts or contractual relationships. Macneil
therefore argues that even if all contracts involve human relations,
they exist in a spectrum of contract wherein some contracts can be
understood as more "relational" and others as more "discrete. 43
Macneil identifies the range of concepts or norms that he believes
apply to contracts generally, and then he determines which of these
norms are strongest in the discrete transactions and which are
stronger as a contract relation becomes more "intertwined. '"44 It is
not so much that Macneil wholly disagrees with the narrow view,
but rather that he does not want us to forget that even contracts
that seem primarily discrete operate in a context of human rela-
tions and norms, and that state created legal rules will affect his
more generalized contract norms which exist in all contracting
situations.
Macneil's architecture of contract norms is complex and a
brief summary cannot do it full justice. Nevertheless we can set
out some of the basic principles. Because of his broad focus on all
contract behavior, Macneil developed a broad typology of norms
39 See, e.g., MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 96-98 (discussing this re-
lationship).
4 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 344-45.
4' Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 7, at 720-21.
42 See, e.g., William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 545 (discussing Macneil's work as a general theory of "social order" which
must extend beyond law and economics). Macneil appreciates the transaction-cost economic
approach of Goetz and Scott, but finds it still "far too unrelational a starting point in analyzing
relational contracts," largely because of its affinities with neoclassical economics. Macneil,
Relational Contract, supra note 7, at 495 n.45.
43 Macneil has recently emphasized that it is better to describe "discrete" transactions with
the term "as-if-discrete," because it is only the study of the transaction that creates the discrete-
ness - even the supposedly discrete transaction is deeply embedded. Macneil, Challenges and
Queries, supra note 7, at 894-95.
4 Macneil prefers the term "intertwined" to describe highly relational contracts because it
emphasizes that all contracts are relational and that some are "more" relational in the sense that
the parties are more interconnected. He also recognizes that this is not a generally accepted
term. See id. at 895; Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology, supra note 7, at 276.
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that apply in all contract relations. The general norms that he
identified as essential to all contract behavior are:
1. Role Integrity
2. Reciprocity (a.k.a. Mutuality)
3. Implementation of Planning
4. Effectuation of Consent
5. Flexibility
6. Contract Solidarity
7. Linking Norms (restitution, reliance, expectation)
8. Creation and Restraint of Power
9. Propriety of Means
10. Harmonization with the Social Matrix.45
According to Macneil, these norms affect all contracting be-
havior, whether such contracts are more discrete or more rela-
tional. Macneil next identifies a subset of norms or values which
are associated with the two ends of the contract spectrum, discrete
and relational contracts. Relational contracts exhibit norms of
Role Integrity, Preservation of the Relation, Harmonization of Re-
lational Conflict, and Supra-Contract Norms.46 Discrete contracts,
on the other hand, emphasize two of the general norms, Implemen-
tation of Planning and Effectuation of Consent, 47 and produce a
subset of additional norms or values particular to discrete con-
tracts, including precision and efficiency. 48 Part of Macneil's pro-
ject is to explore how these various norms interrelate, and how this
interrelation can support or impede contractual relations and social
solidarity more generally.49
Some others have taken the basic themes of Macneil's theory
and, while not necessarily adopting the theory in its full complex-
ity, have similarly advocated that the law approach contract with
far more attention to the norms and structures of the multiple over-
lapping relationships evidenced in many contract relations. Jay
Feinman, for instance, has argued in favor of a relational contract
methodology by which courts would investigate the embeddedness
of the relationship as part of an intensive factual adjudication.
4- MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 40; Macneil, Values in Contract,
supra note 7, at 347.
46 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 66-70. These norms are derived
from his general contract norms, but their particular manifestation in relational contracts appar-
ently alters them. See id. at 65.
47 Id. at 59-60.
411 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 358-60.
49 For other summaries of Macneil's basic theory, see Gudel, supra note 7, at 776-80;
Lees, supra note 7, at 87-93.
1 See generally Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note 10 (noting that many diverse
transactions, including labor and family relations, give rise to "factual differences" that should
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And Jean Braucher has applied a relational perspective to critique
contractarianism as being unrealistic and a distortion of contract
law.5' For the purposes of this Article, however, I will concentrate
my discussion of relational contract theory primarily on Macneil's
theory, both because it is the most developed of any relational the-
ory and because he addresses some of the issues I raise.
B. Relational Contract Theories and Norm Description
Despite their significant differences, both the narrow and
broad relational contract theories force us to look outside doctrine
and toward the world of contract actually practiced; they ask us to
think very seriously about the world of human relations surround-
ing what we tend to think of as the legal contract. Relational con-
tract theory teaches us about the need for law to provide greater
room for industry-created customary norms and dispute resolution
mechanisms, and to explore how law can best promote such norm
development. Relational theory also helps us become more com-
fortable with relational "warps" in contract doctrine. If one ac-
cepts the proposition that the differing relational contexts of dif-
ferent contracts can produce their own variations of contracting
norms, one can more readily understand and accept the alterations
one encounters in particular contracting relations; the unusual
warps of standard contract law created in insurance law52 become
far less problematic than under a more classically based under-
standing of contract law as a consistent and uniform whole.
Yet, despite their great advantages, relational contract theories
tend to view contract law and contractual norms descriptively. To
a certain extent, the relational theorists write about norms as sim-
ply existing. Goetz and Scott, for example, emphasized contract
terms and relationships that already exist in the market.53 These
and other economically-oriented theorists discuss social norms
more as social facts than as normative or foundational.
Elizabeth and Robert Scott approach norms slightly differ-
ently in the context of marriage, but to a similar effect. They ad-
be examined initially when analyzing contracts); Feinman, Default Rules, supra note 10.
Gillian Hadfield has suggested an even stricter relational analysis which focuses entirely on the
norms developed within a relationship and expressly excludes court enforcement of norms ex-
ternal to the relationship. Hadfield, supra note 28, at 930.
51 Braucher, Regulatory Role, supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note 10, at 744-45 (discussing how insur-
ance law has seceded from contract law).
53 Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 1052. As they describe their work, they address "core
provisions of relational contracts" (such as best efforts and termination clauses) and how they
"represent an optimizing response to peculiar environmental constraints of complexity and
uncertainty" and set standards to which courts should be more open. id. at 1091.
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vocate viewing marriage as a relational contract in which the
norms of fidelity, intimacy, love, altruism, honesty, among others,
govern the relationship (at least the healthy relationship). 54  Al-
though Scott and Scott recognize that these norms are complex and
involve both internalized and externally imposed "societal" as-
pects,55 they are not explicitly judging the norms or giving a theo-
retical foundation for them. 56  They focus more on the functions
and roles of these norms than on their meanings or values.57 As
they describe their project, it is "essentially positive, '58 and to the
extent they adopt normative positions, those positions are not par-
ticularly marital-specific and are not explicitly founded on a moral
theory about the values of love, intimacy, etc. Indeed, their nor-
mative claims are either generalized interpersonal values ("mutual
commitment and relational stability") 59 or normative claims more
54 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1289-90 (describing social norms of marriage); id. at
1268 (describing the "core of marital relationship"). The authors also describe these "norms" as
"assets." Id. at 1270.
-5 Id. at 1284 (discussing endogenous and exogenous norms).
6 Elizabeth Scott, in a separate, more recent article, discusses the deep complexity of
norms in marriage. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86
VA. L. REV. 1901 (2000). She provides an excellent analysis of the tensions between commit-
ment norms, commonly associated with traditional ideas of marriage, and egalitarian gender
norms, associated with more modem conceptions, and observes just how hard it is to "unbun-
dle" these norms so as to retain commitment norms while enabling egalitarian norms. Id. at
1946-70. Her article presents a more developed analysis of norms, but even though the author is
sympathetic with both gender equality and interpersonal commitment, she generally avoids
developing a basis for making normative choices among these norms. For instance, Scott makes
an initial assumption that commitment norms are, or should be, ungendered. Id. at 1908. She
also writes as if it were historical accident that commitment norms became associated with
gender inequity, imposing greater obligations on wives than husbands. Id. at 1914; see also id.
at 1916 n.33 (contending that there was a '"contamination' of commitment norms by gender
norms"). It is not at all clear, however, that the development of gender inequality is separable
historically from marital commitment norms; what Scott sees as contamination may well be an
essential historical relationship. (Citation on this point is potentially voluminous, but for one
example, see Catherine MacKinnon's discussion in CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 13-36 (1989)). The modem or liberal choice to privilege
gender equality above commitment is an affirmative normative choice that must be imple-
mented broadly, including by state action and law, to overcome the historic "bundling." Scott
herself seems to emphasize efficiency principles less in her own article than in her work with
Robert Scott, and instead adverts to a Rawlsian original position methodology for divining the
egalitarian principle. Scott, supra, at 1915. My point is mainly to argue for increased attention
to the basis for the state's pro-equality choices and the importance of the relationship between
the state and marital "contracting."
-7 E.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1270 ("Love, friendship, intimacy, mutual support,
and the fulfillment of raising children are indivisible and incommensurable assets."); id. at 1290
("Norms of trustworthiness, solidarity, openness, honesty, harmony, and fulfillment of obliga-
tion between spouses and toward children are widely accepted and frequently serve both bond-
ing and monitoring functions.").
51 Id. at 1233.
59 Id. at 123 1. Elizabeth Scott has more recently developed her analysis of these marital
norms, but continues to focus on a more descriptive analysis of them. See generally Scott,
supra note 56.
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commonly associated with law and economics. 60 These economics
and social norms-influenced relational approaches are often
founded on a normative adherence to utility-maximizing efficiency
and rational actor methodologies, and these normative positions
generally underlie the choice of norms from particular relation-
ships. 6' Even so, the discussion of particular norms by these
scholars remains primarily descriptive.
Ian Macneil presents a more complex (and perhaps ambigu-
ous) approach to contract norms. On the one hand, Macneil di-
vines his contract norms through his own observation of contract
behavior, and he takes a strong position against any normative
moral principle behind his theory: "I wish to disclaim any idea that
[my] theory of relational contract... is a comprehensive 'system'
of values based on utilitarianism, natural law, or any other
dogma., 62 Rather, Macneil identifies two levels of "values": inter-
nal values of contract and external values of society responding to
contract.63  The internal values consist of Macneil's general con-
tracting norms summarized above. Macneil identifies them pri-
marily through his own personal analysis, or, as he notes, through
a process that "social scientists scornfully call casual empiri-
cism. ' 64 On the other hand, Macneil admits that these norms oper-
ate prescriptively in the sense that they are not just what people
actually do when contracting but are also what people ought to do
in order to contract. 65 Nevertheless, Macneil asserts that he is bas-
60 E.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1301 ("A central normative implication of our
analysis is that important default rules governing divorce fail adequately to protect marital in-
vestments."). Scott and Scott also adopt a law-and-economics normative position, without quite
explicitly calling it such, by asserting that "contract theory posits" that law should set rules of
marriage and divorce based on an analysis of what "informed, rational actors in the premarital
context" would contract for. Id. at 1306. In fact it is primarily law-and-economics influenced
contract theory that posits such; Macneilian relational contract theory expressly critiques such a
view and would, I think, find fault with Scott and Scott's use of rational actor assumptions to
address what they also realize are issues of reciprocity and solidarity.
61 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 6, at 275 (identifying the difficulties facing courts in deter-
mining norms supplied as gap-fillers to a contract).
62 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 343 n.5; see also Macneil, Reflections,
supra note 7, at 214. Macneil's claim that his theory is not meant to be comprehensive must be
read in light of his assertions (I) that all human activity should be understood as relational, and
(2) that his theory of exchange relations can profitably be applied to nonmaterial exchange
relations, such as politics. See generally Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE, supra note 7. It may
be more accurate to say that while Macneil would apply his theory to almost all forms of human
relations (since he sees exchange as central to all interpersonal relations), the theory itself does
not attempt to encompass all aspects of these relations or of human existence more broadly.
6. Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 342-43.
1 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 38.
6- Id. at 37-38. This is in part why Macneil now prefers that the normative aspect of his
theory be called "essential contract theory." Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra note 7, at
892-93. I chose here to follow the far more commonly used reference to Macneil's theory as
relational contract theory; I fear that in this case one participant in the discourse, even one so
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ing these norms on his observation and analysis of how contract
relations in fact work, not on some overarching normative system:
"the oughts of [relational contract] theory are the product of what
appears actually to work in social interaction, rather than the result
of formulations derived from more theoretical notions., 66  His ap-
proach is properly seen, then, as inductively based on his own ob-
servations rather than deductively based on moral or political the-
67ory. Macneil asserts a rather ambiguous status for his normative
claims as being both normative and descriptive (or positive).68 The
concept of "norms," for Macneil, "connote[s] both actual behavior
and principles of right action" divined from that behavior, because
"behavior leads logically to convention and convention leads logi-
,,69
cally to norms.
Moreover, for Macneil the internal values generally found in
contract relations have "by far the greatest impact upon the lives of
the participants [in contracts] and everyone affected by their ac-
tivities," and they are, in their aggregate effect, "the most impor-
tant [norms] in determining the value patterns of the overall soci-
ety . . . .,70 Thus, Macneil claims that the internal contract norms
form the foundation for broader social norms and values.
Yet Macneil recognizes that there are also external values
arising from the social context surrounding contract relations
which themselves influence contract values. His typology allows
for these norms in the general contract category of harmonization
central as Macneil, cannot change the established linguistic norm.
66 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 408; see also Speidel, Characteristics and
Challenges, supra note 7, at 827.
67 Macneil describes how he began developing his theory: "[I]t did not occur to me con-
sciously that I might be developing a theory. Rather, I was simply exploring and trying to make
sense of reality, the reality of what people are actually doing in the real-life world of exchange."
Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra note 7, at 879. One can certainly still call this a norma-
tive approach, as Macneil himself insists, because the descriptive work unearths prescriptive
norms, but it is a normativity based on observation. See Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE, supra
note 7, at 154. One could aptly label Macneil's theory as being both empirical and intuitionist.
One could also connect these to T. K. Seung's distinction between transcendent and immanent
intuition: "Immanent intuition is the intuition of positive or prevailing normative standards in
any given society; transcendent intuition is the intuition of normative standards that transcend
all particular societies." T. K. SEUNG, INTUITION AND CONSTRUCTION: THE FOUNDATION OF
NORMATIVE THEORY Xi (1993). Macneil's theory employs both types of intuition.
68 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 37-38; see also Speidel, Charac-
teristics and Challenges, supra note 7, at 827 (stating that Macneil's is a "complex descriptive
theory" which derives normative claims from the norms internal to contract relations, and that
"[t]he 'is' of actual behavior becomes the 'ought' by which the relationship is governed").
69 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 38 (citing theories of the reasoning
process developed in DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969) and
EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977)).
70 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 351. Similarly, "[contract norms] and
their interplay permit the widest possible range of 'successful' human activity and interaction."
Id.
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with the social matrix, and within the relational category of su-
pracontract norms. These external values emanate from the sover-
eign in the form of law, from private associations in the form of
trade rules and regulations, from religious organizations in the
form of moral guidance to individuals and families, and from a
vast array of other social forces and organizations not encom-
passed within a particular contract relation.7' In particular,
Macneil has argued that the law expresses the underlying values of
a society which can provide a basis for social solidarity: "[law
functions] as a relatively precise expression - an index if you will
- of the great underlying and diffuse sea of custom and social
practices in which human affairs are conducted. This function of
law is to tell society what is most important among its customs and
practices.' 72
Macneil does not, however, have a normative theory for the
proper content of these external values. He views them more so-
ciologically. He identifies a potential source of morality in law as
arising from the joining of individual self-interests in a cooperative
project, thus creating a combination of self-interest and solidar-
ity.73  He then cites his own common contract norms as some of
the underlying norms of solidarity which give moral force to the
law, or at least to contract and other exchange-based law.74
C. Relational Contract Theory, Normativity, and the State
This proclivity of relational theories to view social norms as
social facts makes it very hard for the theories to evaluate the
71 Id. at 367-68. Macneil views all these "external" relations as themselves interconnected
through exchange relations and therefore in some sense not truly external, but admits also the
analytic usefulness of the external/internal distinction. Id.
72 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 94. Macneil was a bit ahead of his
time on this point. Legal scholars have more recently explored the expressive value of law in
great detail and from diverse viewpoints. For instance, Richard McAdams has set forth an
interesting version of the role of law in expressing social norms. See, e.g., Richard H.
McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); see also Mat-
thew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363
(2000) (arguing that the expressive theory of law is not persuasive); Matthew D. Adler, Linguis-
tic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression" and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply
Response to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2000) (rebutting Profes-
sor Anderson's arguments against the expressive theory of law); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000) (exploring the expressive dimensions of constitutional law); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (arguing that expressive functions
of law make the most sense in connection with efforts to change social norms).
73 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 97. Interestingly Scott and Scott
also recognize the importance of both self-interest and solidarity, at least in marriage. They
tend, however, to emphasize the former in their methodology. See generally Scott & Scott,
supra note 6.
74 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 98.
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norms and rules actually being studied.75 While relational theory
may improve our understanding of the customs and norms internal
to contract or particular contractual contexts, it becomes very hard
to evaluate the norms. When, if ever, could a trade practice itself
be deemed unfair or unconscionable? 76 Why would the law want
to protect a consumer, or be sensitive to claims of abuse by women
in contractual aspects of marital relations,77 or to support workers
in their relations with employers? Or, more significantly, can rela-
tional contract theory fully credit, let alone support, societal norms
such as anti-discrimination on the basis of race or gender and their
imposition on particular contract relations?
This Article suggests that a focus on contract relations cannot
answer fundamental questions about which norms to support. As
75 I certainly do not mean to deny the great value of this type of work. The focus on social
norms gives a needed depth to legal and law-and-economics analysis, and, as in the case of
Scott and Scott's approach to marriage, makes possible a rich understanding of law and its con-
text that can greatly improve law and society. But any approach (including mine) is incomplete.
I mean only to address what I see as one particular omission of the literature. An example of
how the failure to account for normative democratic principles leads to a weakness in social
norms literature can be seen in the tendency of social norms scholars to refer to political activ-
ists promoting democratic principles as "norm entrepreneurs." See, e.g., Scott, supra note 56, at
1925 ("Acts of domestic violence have been the subject of increasing social censure, as advo-
cacy groups acting as 'norm entrepreneurs,' have publicized information about the harms to
women."); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 394-95 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909-10 (1996). It would, I am sure, be quite a surprise to the political
advocates who press for egalitarian and gender justice on issues such as police responses to
domestic violence to learn that they are entrepreneurs of any sort. The danger with this descrip-
tive term is that it papers over the fundamentalness of the underlying principle (by calling it a
"norm" and equating it, for analytic purposes, with norms such as leashing a canine), and that it
views the democratic actor in terms more related to economics than political and social justice.
While this may not be the meaning these scholars intend to convey, the rhetoric remains flawed.
76 The narrower the relational perspective, the more suspicion is aroused by concepts of
unconscionability. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 1136-38 & n. Ill (arguing in favor
of limiting unconscionability to procedural infirmities). On unconscionability, see infra p. 55.
77 The problem of gender discrimination within the context of marriage is particularly un-
der-developed in Scott and Scott's excellent article on marriage as a relational contract. This
may stem from a deficiency in method. The authors assert that their hypothetical thought ex-
periment of rational pre-marital bargainers will discount or exclude gender biases and differ-
ences. Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1307. This is problematic on several levels, perhaps most
importantly because their hypothesized bargainer seems to follow the male rational actor model.
As Scott and Scott mention, feminists sometimes describe women as "less effective" bargainers
because they value the welfare of others more than do men. Id. (In fact it would be better to
describe this characteristic as different, not "less effective"; it is perhaps less effective in pro-
ducing the results that neoclassical economic theories value, but it is also likely to be superior in
producing results that such women would value.) Scott and Scott then say that this gender
difference is "excluded" from their model. Id. at 1252. This exclusion clearly means that the
other-regarding characteristics are suspended, since in their hypothetical model they posit "two
rational utility maximizers." Id. Other-regarding characteristics then reappear only after these
utility maximizers have (rationally) determined that they are embarking on a joint venture which
requires that they account for each others' interests. Id. at 1266. It is essential to note, however,
that one of the authors has a far more developed analysis of gender discrimination in the context
of the marital "contract" in a subsequent article. See generally Scott, supra note 56.
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discussed above, relationalists tend to overemphasize the descrip-
tive aspect of the study of norms. Beyond this tendency, to the
extent relationalists invoke normative claims, they are either too
limited in scope (as in the case of the efficiency-based normative
claims of economic relationalists) 78 or too general (as in the case
of communitarian claims) to help formulate a theory of the state's
role.79 Indeed, relationalists tend to say relatively little about why
society, and in particular the state, should make the choices that
scholars advocate. 80 For instance, Scott and Scott, in their excel-
lent article analyzing marriage as a relational contract, only come
to the role of the state briefly in their conclusion: "Arguably, the
state has an independent interest in promoting marital cooperation.
Stable families fulfill many functions that the state would other-
wise be required to provide at greater cost .... ,,81 The normative
justification here for state action, and ultimately for marital law, is
efficiency. Perhaps this is a plausible normative reason for state
action, but it certainly is not the only one; the state makes a choice
to promote marriage values, not just fulfill functions, and we need
a more developed normative theory of why such choices are better
for the state to make.
This question is more complicated under Macneil's theory be-
cause Macneil has a more intricate explanation of the state's impo-
sition of norms on contract relations. Macneil argues that dis-
crimination and other forms of oppression are properly viewed
through his eighth contract norm, the creation and restraint of
power: "Above all else what we are witnessing is a massive power
78 The question of whether efficiency can supply an adequate normative basis for law is
far too large and has been engaged by far too many excellent minds for me to address here.
However, I do agree with Macneil that efficiency claims are based on too constrained a view of
human nature and social interaction to be particularly helpful for these purposes. See, e.g.,
Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra note 7, at 889 n.46; see generally Ian R. Macneil,
Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982) (examining the
fallacies of efficient breach analysis); Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations,
supra note 7 (discussing the interplay of neoclassical microeconomics, transactional cost analy-
sis, and contractual relations, and analyzing the problems relations pose for neoclassical micro-
economic analysis).
79 Cf. Braucher, Regulatory Role, supra note 10, at 721-22 (identifying freedom as a prin-
ciple with which to limit contractual analysis). In this article Braucher addresses some of the
questions that I raise, although my analysis centers more on political and democratic theory.
80 This tendency for relationalists to overlook the state perhaps explains why, in a recent
symposium on Macneil and relational contract theory, there was almost no discussion of legisla-
tion, even among scholars who agree with Macneil. Macneil himself frequently points toward
legislative law as a source of relational contract law, but other contracts scholars seem fixated
on contract doctrine, courts, and private law. See, e.g., Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note
10, at 744-45; Mertz, supra note 8, at 913-14; see generally Speidel, Characteristics and Chal-
lenges, supra note 7 (reviewing the characteristics that typify relational contracts and discussing
the challenges posed by those contracts to the administration of contract law by the courts).
8' Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1332-33.
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game, and it is being won by the 'private' institutions., 82
Macneil's norms of solidarity and reciprocity are also implicated
by discrimination as discriminatory actions arguably deny solidar-
ity and reduce reciprocity between the parties to a bare minimum.
This concern with the power balance in contract relations in
fact characterizes several of the long-practicing relational contract
theorists, including Macneil. Stewart Macaulay, for instance, sug-
gests that the non-relationalist, formalist approach to contract law,
which privileges the written contract, "reinforces the power of
those who draft those documents, usually the lawyers who repre-
sent those with superior bargaining power., 83  The problem for
relational contract theory, however, is its justification for resolving
this imbalance. Macneil does not believe that the state can provide
any adequate check on this "power game." He has argued that the
modern state is incapable of promoting values because it is so
deeply bureaucratic: "[W]hile we like to think we are a democracy,
and while some people think we are a plutocracy, the fact is that
America is a bureaucracy. 84 For Macneil, the state is not capable
of promoting democratic values or other values beyond those in-
herent in bureaucratic organization. Furthermore, he de-
emphasizes the potential impact his theory could or should have on
activities of the sovereign: "Those who read relational contract
theory as necessarily or presumptively supporting great sovereign
intervention are mistaken." 85  More recently Macneil has argued
that the remnants of the democratic state that remain in a world
increasingly dominated by private, international financial powers
are inadequate for the task of balancing power in exchange rela-
tions. The idea of a democratic state promoting democratic values
82 Macneil, Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 436. For Macneil's ten contracting
norms, see supra text accompanying note 45. Jay Feinman has recently argued that certain
areas of law have already adopted a version of relational analysis, and that this has happened in
particular in areas where there is a clear inequality between bargaining or exchanging parties:
insurance, landlord-tenant, and products liability. See Feinman, Theory in Context, supra note
10, at 744-46.
83 Macaulay, Floating, supra note 8, at 800.
m' Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community - American Style, 79 Nw. U.
L. REV. 900, 903 (1984) [hereinafter Macneil, Bureaucracy]; see also MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 108-17 (critiquing modem bureaucracies, including the centralized
state, and presenting his own Utopian alternative); Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at
352 n.36 ("Although I believe the state has a role respecting the common conscience ... I con-
sider the modem bureaucratic state a relatively poor provider on that score."); see generally
Macneil, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 7 (analyzing certain aspects of modem bureaucracy
and exploring their relationship to contracts of adhesion and liberal theory).
85 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 410; see also id. at 410 n.217 ("[Wle have
far too much sovereign law imposing norms of various kinds on contracts.").
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and norms seems, under Macneil's approach, at best quaint and
hopelessly utopian.86
While Macneil does in this way address the problem of state
implementation of values, the values he identifies are primarily
those internal to his own relational contract theory. The state is
one of the many human institutions which can affect these contract
norms, but there is no particular justification for these norms as
being themselves supported by a political or moral theory. This is,
of course, consistent with Macneil's rejection of a normative basis
for his theory more generally. Ultimately, though, Macneil's the-
ory is deeply pessimistic; he leaves little room for the effectuation
of normative goals, whether they be his contract norms or other
norms developed outside his exchange relationships.
Indeed, the closest Macneil comes to acknowledging a proper
role for extra-contract norms is in his "contract" norms of su-
pracontract norms and the harmonization of contract with the so-
cial matrix. This, however, seems a rather thin account of poten-
tially significant norms. Unlike his other norm categories, su-
pracontract is an empty vessel with no substance of its own. It
serves more or less as a catchall category, a bin of miscellany
which allows his theory to account for norm-influences external to
the contract relation without ever developing or adopting a theory
for those norms. Indeed, unlike his position with respect to his
other contract norms, Macneil never really credits supracontract
norms with anything other than a sociological, descriptive exis-
tence.87 Contract norms are for him essential, other norms are
simply there. This is especially problematic with respect to the
norms which can govern actions by the state, since that is the most
critical source for imposition of norms on contract through law.
Macneil's failure to address fully the role and norms of the
state stems both from his general pessimism about state actions
and from his insistence on seeing the contract relation as the center
of relations. 88 When describing the role of the other social rela-
16 Macneil, Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 436.
17 Macneil asserts that it is "incorrect" to assume that "norms not included in the common
contract norms are not highly valued in relational contact [sic] theory." Macneil, Values in
Contract, supra note 7, at 411. I embrace this mistake. I do so because Macneil allows as non-
contract norms mainly those norms existing in particular historical-social contexts. Id. Thus
Macneil views such norms far more descriptively and atheoretically than his own contract
norms. It is a bit hard to see how such non-contract norms are "highly valued" when they re-
ceive little analytic attention or development in Macneil's theory, although it is probably ade-
quate to note that Macneil is focusing on one particular theory - relational contract - and that he
leaves non-contract norms to other theorists.
18 See id. at 410. Macneil claims:
In terms of policies for positive law of sovereign states, [relational contract]
theory itself offers direct guidance only when imposition of norms on con-
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tions which affect contracts, and which Macneil strongly insists
need to be studied in order to understand contract, he nonetheless
describes them as "enveloping" relations.89  It is as if contract is
the center of an onion and Macneil is trying to study all the sur-
rounding layers but always with the assumption that contract lies
at the core.90 Or, put slightly differently, Macneil sees politics
(and its product, the state) as largely exchange-based and therefore
subject to his relational contract norms.9' Considering that
Macneil and other relationalists begin with the study of contract
and contract law, this "enveloping" schematic makes sense. It
does, however, make it difficult for someone even as broadly fo-
cused on all social interaction as is Macneil to appreciate the non-
contractual aspects of significant human relations.92 If we think of
the state as something enveloping contract, it will make sense to
see contract norms as paradigmatic and non-contract norms im-
posed by the state as problematic.93
tracts within the state either erodes norms within them beyond viable limits or
is essential in order to preserve contract norms at the minimum levels neces-
sary for the contractual relations to continue.
Id. at 410.
89 Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra note 7, at 884.
90 Macneil himself prefers the culinary and culturally specific metaphor of the Scotch Egg
wrapped in Haggis (he also mentions metaphors of a web and DNA). See Macneil, Reflections,
supra note 7, at 208-12. Macneil's metaphors emphasize the interconnectedness of the multiple
relations. The basic idea, however, that contract and exchange are at the core of his analysis
remains in both his and my metaphors.
91 See Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE, supra note 7, at 161.
92 The contract-centric approach of relationalists also produces a fear that if contract law
looks outside contract norms, contract will become tort. Cf Gudel, supra note 7, at 773 (sug-
gesting that Macneil's relational contract theory avoids the problem of contract law devolving
into a tort-like approach of applying "a general social standard of acceptable behavior"). The
ghost of Grant Gilmore's prophecy of the death of contracts haunts contract theorists. See gen-
erally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (contending that contract law is
dissolving back into tort law); Symposium, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995) (reflecting upon and exploring underlying themes of
Gilmore's seminal piece). I suggest that the external norms of behavior can be based, at least in
part, on norms of democratic citizenship rather than the more encompassing norms of general
social conduct.
93 It is worth noting that Macneil's focus on contract norms and relations rests in part on
an underlying belief that these norms reflect Durkheimian ideas of organic solidarity.
MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 91. Macneil argues that organic solidarity
is the solidarity of different persons based on particular needs for exchange. Organic solidarity
"consists of a common belief in effective future interdependence ... [and] applies to the close
interdependence of marriage, to the purchase of a television set on time, to employment with a
law firm ... right on up to the nation-state... Id. Organic solidarity is thus the Ur-force on
which Macneil's theory of contract norms rests. See Macaulay, Floating, supra note 8, at 777;
Mertz, supra note 8, at 913 n.23; Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of
Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 565, 568-70 (reviewing the social
and cooperative aspects of Macneil's and Macaulay's contract theories). For Durkheim's the-
ory, see generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson
trans., The Free Press 1949) (1933). Ultimately, so long as people feel this sense of solidarity in
their relations - relations at any level - then exchange can continue to be an exchange of goods,
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If, on the other hand, we think of the democratic state as a
parallel relationship with its own core of norms (norms as "valu-
able" as contract norms), it may be possible to understand and
value more fully the impositions of law on the contract relation-
ship. By shifting our theoretical apparatus to imagine the state as a
separate sphere of relational activity, of the state as representing
relations of people as citizens, we may be more willing to see
norms of citizenship as co-equal, yet not co-extensive, with con-
tracting norms.94  Macneil has shown some signs of moving toward
such a view of the state as properly mediating contract norms and
other essential but non-contractual norms,95 and it is the point of
this article to work through one possible theory which does this.
In order to flesh out this alternative conception of the rela-
tionship between the democratic state and contract relations, it
may help to explore some of the historical connections between
contract and democratic citizenship. Relational contract theory
focuses primarily on the contractual and exchange relations among
people, but people have other relations. Most significantly for the
purpose of law in a democratic society, people relate to each other
as citizens through the state. The political relationship of people
as embodied in the state supplies the enforceability of contract law
and can significantly alter contract law by implementing societal
an exchange that benefits each party. If, however, people begin to believe that those with social
power are getting too much out of the exchange relation, they come to see the relation shift from
an exchange of goods to an exchange of harms, and solidarity will collapse. MACNEIL, NEW
SOCIAL CONTRACr, supra note 7, at 103. It is in part based on this foundation for Macneil's
theory, and in part because Macneil repeatedly emphasizes the importance of his contract norms
for social solidarity, that I believe his theory as he applies it is far more comprehensive than he
is willing to assume. Macneil, however, disagrees. See, e.g., Macneil, Relational Contract
Theory as Sociology, supra note 7, at 277 ("Relational contract theory is not intended.., to be a
complete theory of human relations, an impossibility in any event."). While Macneil's theory
may not be complete, given the breadth of his definition of contract and relational contract
(which includes the "world socioeconomy") and the centrality (or, as Macneil now prefers,
"essential" nature) of his norms to contract, it is hard not to view his theory as encompassing
most human behavior. See Macneil, Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 432.
94 Randy Barnett has also argued that relational contract theory needs to be placed in a
larger context. His approach is to consider relational contract theory in connection with his own
consent theory of contract, which "explicitly places contract theory within a larger theory of
entitlements or property." Barnett, supra note 9, at 1181. My approach differs in at least a
couple of significant respects. First, while I seek to situate relational contract theory in a con-
text of democratic theory, I do not claim that relational contract theory is a subset of democratic
or political theory. They are related, and can inform each other, but at most they are overlap-
ping theories. Second, as a political theory, democratic citizenship theory focuses far more on
the relationships in which people are engaged and on both the communal and the individual
aspects of these relations than does Barnett. A fuller discussion of Barnett's theory is beyond
the scope of this Article, but is certainly deserved.
95 See Macneil, Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 435 (discussing the possibility of
"sovereign law" accounting for a range of "social subsystems," including the subsystems of
race, class, and gender at work in an employment relation).
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norms and principles. 96 Indeed, it is precisely this interaction be-
tween democratic principles and contract relations that was so
critical during one of the periods of significant state involvement
in contract relations: Reconstruction. It is to this example we now
turn.
II. DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND CONTRACT RELATIONS:
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RIGHT CONTRACT
Reconstruction represents the period during which American
law first engaged the interrelation of democracy, race, and con-
tract. The contractual relations and norms existing at the time con-
fronted the citizenship relations and democratic ideals at the heart
of the progressive movement for racial justice. This historical
moment therefore serves as a potential source for better under-
standing and developing a theory of the connections between rela-
tional contract theory and ideas of democratic citizenship. This
section will briefly review the historical issues; the next section
will develop the theoretical claims.
A. Reconstruction
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 established the right to contract
as a foundation of American citizenship. The Act declared that all
citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
96 My emphasis on the connections of the state to relational contracts and the importance
of contract law differs markedly from some relationalists, who view the state and the sover-
eign's law as at best peripheral. In particular, Gidon Gottlieb has argued that "the idea that law
is necessarily derived from the State through its legislative and judicial organs and that it de-
pends upon the State for its efficacy is warranted neither by a historical perspective nor by the
experience of relational societies." Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 568. Gottlieb's points are well
taken. The fact that much behavior is governed by social norms and private agreements does
not mean, however, that the norms developed and enforced by the state are not essential. More-
over, if one accepts Gottlieb's definition of private norms as "law" themselves, one still will
need to talk about the distinct concept of the "law of the State." I find it more helpful to follow
a traditional definition of law as excluding private norms (though the outer limits of law may
include enforceable contract terms). Gottlieb's article is probably now more accurately associ-
ated with social norms scholarship, much of which developed after his work was published.
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other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to
the contrary notwithstanding.97
While one can debate whether this Act guaranteed a minimal level
of substantive contract rights or instead promised merely equality
of contract rights, the right to contract is central to the Act's im-
plementation of citizenship under either view.
98
The freedom of African-Americans to contract had been
greatly impeded, socially and legally, throughout the country be-
fore the Civil War.99 Reconstruction Republicans saw this right as
central to their ideal of a free labor society in which each (male)
citizen had the capacity to sell his labor freely and make a living:
"The laws of contract are the foundation of civilization."0° Re-
construction ideals of freedom of contract rested on the antebel-
lum, abolitionist ideology of free labor in which "[f]reedom meant
economic independence, ownership of productive property - not as
an end in itself primarily, but because such independence was es-
sential to participating freely in the public realm."''1 The connec-
tions between ideas of free labor and the principles of liberty of
contract constituted one of the essential principles of abolition ju-
risprudence and were central to the freedom and citizenship cre-
ated by the Reconstruction amendments.
10 2
97 Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
98 I have recently argued that the Act should be read to guaranty a minimal baseline of
rights. Others disagree. See James W. Fox Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House,
Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 97-99 & n. 113
(2002).
99 See, e.g., LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY, THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES,
1790-1860, at 157-58 (1961).
"'o ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
164 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) (quoting letter of George W.
Welch to Benjamin F. Butler, May 19, 1874, Benjamin F. Butler Papers, Library of Congress).
Foner sees this ideology as "hopelessly unrealistic" in light of the actual conditions and lack of
free will involved in labor contracts in the South. Id; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1151-52 (1866) (Representative Thayer supporting the Civil Rights Bill and identifying
the right of contract as one of the "fundamental rights of citizenship" and one "of those great
natural rights to which every man is entitled by nature"); id. at 475 (Senator Trumbull describ-
ing the rights in the Civil Rights Bill as the "rights of citizens" and "the great fundamental
right").
101 William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded
Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 774-75; see generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970) (discussing
ideologies that led to the Civil War, including the North's view that free labor was a fundamen-
tal right).
102 Forbath, supra note 101, at 786. Forbath importantly observes that there were at least
two strands of abolitionist free labor ideology affecting Reconstruction Era legal discourse: one
focused on free labor as an expression of citizenship participation in the republic, and the other
focused on the moral justifications for a liberty of contract regime. Id. at 772-86. On the ten-
sions inherent in applying free labor principles in the postwar South, see generally WILLIAM
COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR
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Supported in part by this ideological commitment to freedom
of contract and free labor, and in part by the postwar rejection of
providing decent land to former slaves,'0 3 enforcement of the labor
contract constituted a dominant activity of the Freedmen's Bureau.
The Bureau wrote or rewrote labor contracts which local officials
had the plantation owners and freedmen sign, in part to ensure
some level of uniformity in basic contractual rights.' °4 Some Bu-
reau officials even seem to have relied on free labor ideology to
-enforce their own versions of the more modern contract doctrines
of unconscionability and public policy: "One Bureau official lec-
tured a North Carolina planter who desired [contractually] to bar
blacks from leaving the plantation without his permission: 'Con-
tracts of this nature when the landowner undertakes to control the
personal liberty of the laborers, are utterly foreign to free institu-
tions.,-' 0 5 It was believed, even if naively, that establishing a writ-
ten contract with terms consistent with free labor would preserve
the basic rights of a laborer to the fruits of his labor, and that such
labor and contract rights were an integral aspect of American de-
mocratic citizenship. State-enforced contract labor was liberated
labor.
Even in the more contested arena of women's citizenship, this
period saw significant implementation of contract rights for
women. The law of femme covert was gradually coming to an end
with the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in the
mid-nineteenth century. 0 6 While rights of married women to con-
tract lagged behind their rights to property, the importance of con-
tract rights for women was being recognized, especially as those
contract rights related to property. 0 7 The fact that contract rights
RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915 (1991).
103FONER, supra note 100, at 161-67.
"°1 COHEN, supra note 102, at 72-74; FONER, supra note 100, at 165.
105 FONER, supra note 100, at 165.
106For a review of this history and its historiography, see generally Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82
GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994) (stating that while the statutes enacted during the nineteenth century gave
wives greater legal authority, they still were not on equal ground with their husbands); see also
ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 1800-
1861, at 57-247 (1987) (reprinting a dissertation written in 1960 and arguing that by the middle
of the 1840s the liberalization of women's legal status had begun); Richard H. Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983) (commenting that the passing of
the Married Women's Property Acts reflected the increasing responsibility women were assum-
ing over family affairs).
107 See WARBASSE, supra note 106, at 282-87; Siegel, supra note 106, at 2141-43 (describ-
ing the postwar legislation which gave married women rights to their earnings and a capacity to
contract and sue as a "second wave of reform legislation"); see also Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal
Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471
(1988) (critiquing the disjunction between postwar ideas of wage freedom for men and the lim-
ited amount of wage freedom enacted for women).
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preceded voting rights for African-Americans and women indi-
cates the fundamental nature of contracting for the foundation of
democratic citizenship. 108
B. Lessons from Reconstruction
The definition of citizenship implemented by the laws and
policies of Reconstruction evidence an expansive understanding of
democratic citizenship as being the mediating point for a variety of
relationships. With respect to the labor relationship, formal writ-
ten contracts, enforced with the consistency of contract law, were a
recognized way in which the state could try to guaranty former
slaves the basic rights and liberties denied them under slavery.
The formal contract served as the focal point for mediating the
citizen-relation and labor-relation, with the goal of allowing the
individual to develop his citizenship through his labor.
Moreover, it was evident that freedom of contract required
supervision, by the state, of contract terms. While many officers
of the Bureau allowed plantation owners to include and enforce
oppressive contract terms which limited the right of workers to
leave plantations and enabled planters to withhold the onetime
payment at the end of the year, others in the Bureau supervised the
terms closely, striking such contract terms and even imposing a
minimum wage when the market rate fell below a living wage. 109
State enforcement of free contract thus required some protections
associated with modern contract and labor law - doctrines of un-
conscionability, illegality of terms, and wage rate restrictions - in
order to create a real chance at freedom through contract.
Similarly, by protecting the right of African-Americans to
marry, Reconstruction Era legal changes enabled the development
of the family relationship. Slavery oppressed in part by the denial
of the rights of marriage and family; democratic citizenship re-
quired the state to protect the right to, and space for, family rela-
tionships. One of the most important immediate results of freedom
for former slaves was the chance to reunite with their families.' 10
As Peggy Cooper Davis has observed, "African-Americans con-
1o8 But contract rights, by themselves, cannot secure equal democratic citizenship. See in-
fra Part IV.
109 FONER, supra note 100, at 165.
ii0 FONER, supra note 100, at 82-85. Charles Sumner, supporting the Civil Rights Bill in
1865, cited favorably how the 1861 Russian emancipation of the serfs guarantied the "rights of
family and the right of contract" as central components of freedom from bondage. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 91 (1865). Amy Dru Stanley notes, however, that for women
there was no right to contract and that Sumner's twin rights were largely male rights. Stanley,
supra note 107, at 471.
[Vol. 54:1
RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
sciously claimed the status and responsibilities of spouse, of par-
ent, and of citizen. The formation of legally recognized marriage
bonds signified treatment as a human being rather than as a chattel
- acceptance as people and as members of the political commu-
nity.""' At the very least, the state was seen as the proper vehicle
for the protection of the sphere of family as an aspect of full citi-
zenship.
Education was also recognized as a fundamental aspect of
democratic citizenship, for without education, African-Americans
could not achieve within the economic and political spheres. One
of the moderate successes of Reconstruction was the effort to es-
tablish education for former slaves who had for generations been
denied basic literacy and opportunities for primary education. "1
2
Reconstruction Republicans understood the central role of educa-
tion in any system of free citizenship; indeed, the right to contract
could prove meaningless without the capacity to contract and make
informed choices.
We can also learn from Reconstruction how these principles
can fail. By implementing contract ideology as a discrete ideology
unsupported by other structures of citizenship such as voting and
property, contract produces oppression, not freedom. Early in Re-
construction, President Johnson blocked attempts to provide land
to the freedmen; the land they had worked in slavery was returned
to the plantation owners, and labor contracts were used to once
again bind black laborers to the land and white landowners. With-
out property rights and property ownership, labor contracts op-
pressed. 113 And when the Freedmen's Bureau and state and local
officials enforced labor contracts against the workers with the
threat of arrest for not laboring, the "contract" oppressed abso-
lutely. This coercive contract enforcement regime was imposed on
I "'PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VAL-
UES 35 (1997).
'
2 See James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L.
REV. 421, 531 (1999) (noting that the Bureau coordinated the efforts of benevolent societies to
educate hundreds of thousands of African-American children); see also Paul A. Cimbala, Mak-
ing Good Yankees: The Freedmen's Bureau and Education in Reconstruction Georgia, 1865-
1870, 29 ATLANTA HIST. J. 5 (1985), reprinted in THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK
FREEDOM 57 (Donald G. Nieman, ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU];
JACQUELINE JONES, SOLDIERS OF LIGHT AND LOVE: NORTHERN TEACHERS AND GEORGIA
BLACKS, 1865-1873 (1980) (describing the eagerness of teachers to help educate the freed peo-
pie).
p 13 On the importance of property for the former slaves, see generally Paul A. Cimbala,
The Freedmen's Bureau, the Freedmen, and Sherman 's Grant in Reconstruction Georgia, 1865-
1867, 55 J. S. HIST. 597 (1989), reprinted in THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 112, at 62;
CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE (1978). In essence the freedmen saw labor
contracts in the absence of property ownership as a return to slavery. See FONER, supra note
100, at 160-61.
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blacks exclusively, emphasizing that oppressive contracting was
reserved for blacks, not whites.' 14  Add to this the difficulty of
seeking redress in cases of contract disputes because of the com-
plex combination of the unavailability of legal representation, the
lack of fair tribunals, and the absence of education sufficient to
know one's rights, and there was little even a fair contract ar-
rangement could do to prevent social and economic oppression." 5
Ultimately, the failure of Reconstruction to create significant free-
dom of labor indicates as strongly as any other episode in our his-
tory that it is essential for contract to exist in an environment of
legal, political, and social citizenship protection. 116 The contract
relation, in and of itself, means little in a vacuum.
This point is also evident from the citizenship status of
women during and after Reconstruction. The increased capacity
for women to contract during the nineteenth century probably im-
proved women's position, at least economically." 7  Absent suf-
frage, however, it did not guaranty women an improved status as
democratic citizens. This is perhaps one of the reasons that the
Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments declared "the elective
franchise" to be the "first right of a citizen" and stated that all
other legal disabilities, including the rights to property and wages
(and implicitly the contract rights which flow from these), de-
pended on the denial of the vote."
8
Reconstruction therefore cannot be the ultimate source for
identifying the full range of democratic citizenship. Its impact was
limited. It failed to produce significant changes economically; its
political advances were rescinded in the last decades of the nine-
teenth century; its very foundation and implementation was am-
biguous and contested; and it failed to address the extension of
114 FONER, supra note 100, at 166.
115See generally FONER, supra note 100, at 165-67.
"
6 W.E.B. DuBois expressed this point about the need for a full panoply of supports for
freedom when he argued that a full federal commitment to
a national system of Negro schools; a carefully supervised employment and
labor office; a system of impartial protection before the regular courts; and
such institutions for social betterment as a savings-bank, land and building
associations, and social settlements... [could have] formed a great school of
prospective citizenship, and solved in a way we have not yet solved the most
perplexing and persistent of the Negro problems.
W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 39 (Dover 1994) (1903).
"
7 See generally Siegel, supra note 106.
'1
8 See THE SENECA FALLS DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS, 1848, reprinted in AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 264-66 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996). On
the importance of the Nineteenth Amendment's guaranty of women's right to suffrage as an
important step to establishing women's equal citizenship, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the




basic rights to women and members of other racial minorities.
Nonetheless, Reconstruction does help us focus our attention on
the potential connections between contract and citizenship rela-
tions in ways that may clarify the social-political context for rela-
tional contract theory.
III. RECONSTRUCTING RELATIONAL CONTRACT: THE CITIZENSHIP
RELATION
The question then is what sort of political theory do we want
to use to evaluate contract law as understood by relational contract
theory? This Article suggests that the most sensible way, one
which respects the contextualizing spirit of relational contract the-
ory yet also advances a more developed role for the state, is a the-
ory that centers on the democratic citizen but which accounts for
the plurality of social interactions in which people engage and
which constitute the larger community. This theory, which has its
roots in the work of Michael Walzer and others, 1 9 views democ-
ratic society as comprised of a host of relational spheres with over-
lapping value systems emanating from each sphere. Reconstruc-
tion thus serves both as a source of ideas about contract and citi-
zenship, and as a negative example to illustrate the need for a
broader, more plural approach to democratic citizenship.
A. Situating the Theory
Before exploring this theory in more detail, however, let me
first situate it in the context of the approaches of Ian Macneil and
Michael Walzer. Walzer sets forth a theory of justice which ex-
pressly focuses on goods themselves. He disclaims a theory of
distributive justice which focuses on distribution because he be-
lieves that it omits the essential aspect of the goods - that they
have meanings upon being produced or created, that their meaning
is prior to their distribution. In this sense "one might almost say
that goods distribute themselves among people,"' 20 and Walzer
studies the meaning of particular goods that produce the distribu-
tive meanings and structures. But Walzer's theory is more than
merely a study of diverse norms; for him, when these spheres and
meanings of goods interact in a positive way, they produce what he
'9 See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (setting forth the theory
of complex equality). My own approach is heavily influenced by the many wonderful essays
about Walzer's theory in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY (David Miller & Michael Wal-
zer eds., 1995).
120WALZER, supra note 119, at 7.
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terms complex equality.' 2' Under complex equality, the inequali-
ties within each sphere are legitimate so long as people disadvan-
taged in one sphere can engage in other spheres where they are
advantaged, or at least not disadvantaged.
Macneil focuses on exchange. But his idea of exchange
would encompass all relations among people involving Walzer's
goods. Where Walzer uses "distribute" to mean "give, allocate,
[and] exchange,"' 122 Macneil appears to use "exchange" to encom-
pass Walzer's distribution concept. Following Macneil's basic
argument about the ubiquity of exchange, one can argue that allo-
cation is in fact a form of exchange. 23 The concept of allocation
focuses on the one-sided power of the entity which controls a (of-
ten scarce) good to distribute the good, whereas exchange com-
monly refers to two parties trading. But when a party allocates,
someone is receiving and usually exchanges something for the al-
location, though perhaps indirectly. The state may allocate welfare
expenditures, but this is done in the broader exchange relationship
of the citizen's obligations to the state. Thus Macneil, in discuss-
ing the importance of viewing political power from an exchange
perspective, argues that "the distinction between unilateral power
and reciprocal power, is, to an important degree, a false one."'
124
When people focus on allocation, then, they are, from a Macneil-
ian perspective, simply focusing on one aspect of the political ex-
change relation.
These two theories overlap to the extent that both focus on so-
cial relations and the norms, meanings, and values arising from
those relations. One of Macneil's primary points is that there is a
network of social relations involved in all exchanges. Similarly,
Walzer observes that the goods at issue in his theory are social
goods. 25 Despite Walzer's initial rhetorical emphasis on goods
distributing themselves, he readily admits that social meanings
arise out of the "social" aspect of social goods and not the "good-
in-itself."'126 The two theories differ, however, in how they view
the structure of norm creation. Whereas Walzer is looking for the
121 Id. at 19; David Miller, Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, su-
pro note 119, at 197-204; David Miller, Introduction to PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY,
supra note 119, at I, 12-13. But see Amy Gutmann, Justice Across the Spheres, in PLURALISM,
JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 119, at 99 (criticizing Walzer's version of a spherical
complex equality).
122 WALZER, supra note 119, at 6.
123 Cf. SELECTED WORKS, supra note 7, at 47-48 (discussing the breadth of Macneil's con-
cept of exchange).
124 Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE, supra note 7, at 154.




variety of norms arising out of the diversity of social goods,
Macneil concentrates on the norms underlying exchange itself.
Walzer's theory thus studies a greater plurality of norms than does
Macneil's. MacNeil and Walzer also differ in their approach to
the state. Whereas for Macneil the state is a dangerous Levia-
than,127 for Walzer the state can be (note: can, not is) a positive
source guarding the spheres to promote complex equality. 128
The theory I postulate seeks to merge these two approaches
somewhat. One of my primary critiques of Macneil is his failure
to credit different sets of norms from non-contractual relations. In
this sense, I adopt the pluralism of Walzer's approach. Walzer,
however, tends to downplay the relationships and relational con-
texts themselves in favor of a focus on the particular good. Con-
sequently, Macneil provides guidance by concentrating on the in-
terpersonal and collective relationships. Macneil is ultimately
concerned with the root of social meaning itself, which he defines
as organic solidarity. Walzer might well agree with this concept,
but it plays a lesser role in his theory of spheres of justice. The
theory adopted here focuses on relational contexts rather than
goods. 129 I do not, however, believe that Macneil's concept of ex-
change can be extended nearly as far as he supposes.13  While
things are in fact exchanged in the citizen relationship, exchange
does not explain the foundational norms of democracy. For these
we need to look at the nature of the democratic relationship itself.
B. What Is the Theory?
Relational contract theory focuses on exchange relations.
What I want to do is consider the fundamental relation for the pur-
pose of law as being that of democratic citizenship. Democratic
citizenship is crucial for law because it is the primary manner in
which the state relates to its citizens and which ultimately gives
the law its authority. This "relationship" has its own norms -
'27 Macneil, particularly in his writings of the 1980s, often referred to the state this way.
See, e.g., Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 84, at 944.
1281 agree with David Miller's reading of Walzer's SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 119,
to advance a concept of equal citizenship. Miller, Introduction, supra note 121, at 3, 12-13.
Miller believes equal citizenship is not, however, a fundamental principle for Walzer's theory;
in contrast it is fundamental in my approach.
129 Jon Elster has distinguished between theories of justice that focus on contexts (families,
friends, professions) and theories, such as Walzer's, that focus on the good to be allocated
(grapefruits or avocados). Jon Elster, The Empirical Study of Justice, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE,
AND EQUALITY, supra note 119, at 81, 86-88 (also identifying four other types of theories). My
approach leans more towards the former by focusing on relational contexts.
130This difference marks perhaps my clearest break with Macneil's theory. As my discus-
sion below tries to make clear, I do not think an exchange theory of all human relations is either
workable or accurate.
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
those of democratic citizenship - which are the foundation of le-
gitimate state action. This theory is explicitly normative to the
extent that it takes positions based on a belief that those positions
are correct, are theoretically justifiable, and ought to be imple-
mented, and it makes judgments about what people are and should
be as democratic citizens.'
31
The relational emphasis of democratic citizenship makes it a
natural counterpart to relational contract theory. In one sense, the
political community is itself seen as a form of ongoing long-term
contract. There is no moment of "discrete" contracting or agree-
ment between a citizen and the polity. Consent is an ongoing
process, and the state is constantly seeking the re-consent of its
members. Indeed, where discrete consent is sufficient there is no
longer democracy; Hitler came to power by consent. One of the
things that marks off the democratic state from other states is the
need for repeat or ongoing consent. 32
It is not sufficient, however, simply to consider citizenship
another instantiation of relational contract. Because relational
contract theories focus on exchange, they carry with them some
critical limitations. To the extent that exchange implies economic
transactions and material exchanges, it is inappropriate as a model
"I The normativity I propose for a theory of democratic citizenship accounts for both in-
ductive reasoning of what democracy is and has been - the norms that rise up from below in
democratic society - and deductive reasoning of the nature of democracy from political theo-
retical. Ultimately I believe some version of reflective equilibrium is necessary through which
evidence of democratic norms arising from practice is compared with more deontological theo-
ries about what democracy should be. I find particularly helpful on this score T. K. Seung's
discussion of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, where Seung sets forth his own theory of dual
consideration. SEUNG, supra note 67, at 46-70; see also id. at 61 (emphasizing "the need to be
sensitive to the empirical dimension of the normative world, and ... the need to be faithful to
the transcendent ideals"). Rawls' own idea of reflective equilibrium does not address empirical
evidence; rather, for Rawls the dynamic of reflective equilibrium compares his deontological
principles of justice with considered moral judgments which are primarily intuitive. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-45 (Belknap Press 1999) (1971). It is other theorists, such as
Seung, who propose the comparison of empirical understandings with the theoretical principles.
Cf Elster, supra note 129 (discussing Walzer's analysis by examining the descriptive, explana-
tory, and normative approaches to distributive justice); DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 42-92 (1999) (assessing the significance of considering empirical evidence regarding
how norms of justice are applied in social contexts, in regards to developing an adequate theory
of justice).
1 2 Walzer makes this point in the context of the treatment of guest workers. Guest work-
ers (resident aliens) are often treated tyrannically in the sense that the society obtains their labor
but offers them no membership benefits (welfare protections and basic rights) in return. Some
might contend that the workers consent to this upon their initial entry as guest workers. Walzer
replies that "this kind of consent, given at a single moment in time, while sufficient to legitimize
market transactions, is not sufficient for democratic politics. Political power is precisely the
ability to make decisions over periods of time, to change the rules, to cope with emergencies; it
can't be exercised democratically without the ongoing consent of its subjects." WALzER, supra
note 119, at 58. Relational contract theory would point out that such onetime consent is often
not sufficient for market transactions either, at least of the long-term type.
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for citizenship relations. This is a clear defect with narrow rela-
tional theories, which focus on long-term contracts in business re-
lations and emphasize economic exchanges as well as economic
analysis and norms. While such theories account for nonmaterial
aspects of contract relations, such nonmaterial aspects exist in the
theories primarily in the effect they have on economic exchanges.
By contrast, in democratic citizenship the goods being ex-
changed are not the stuff of contract exchange. Democratic poli-
tics is not the market, and democratic political power is not eco-
nomic power. Citizens exchange nonmarketable, nonmaterial
goods.133  Membership in democratic society is not for sale, and
while its meaning may be under constant negotiation, one does not
barter in citizenship. This is particularly true of American citizen-
ship after the Civil War when the Fourteenth Amendment created
birthright citizenship. 134  The basic rights of citizenship, and the
equality of those rights, are a baseline of democratic citizenship. 135
The content of these rights will be a constant negotiation (it is de-
mocracy, after all), but the rights are negotiated through democ-
ratic politics, not economic exchanges. Disabled citizens should
not have to purchase the right to be free of discrimination; they
should instead be able to engage in political discourse with politi-
cians and other citizens, demonstrating how their claims to em-
ployment and access rights are coextensive with the rhetoric of
rights already developed.
One might counter that this theory is wishful; in fact, democ-
ratic politics is purchased and bartered. After all, legislation is
passed in the world of monied politics, and lobbying is big busi-
ness. True, but when this happens, democratic politics is cor-
rupted. The need for campaign finance reform arises, and the
claim for reform resonates so loudly, because democratic politics
1.'. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (argu-
ing that inalienabilities need to be analyzed under a concept of human flourishing); Judith An-
dre, Blocked Exchanges: A Taxonomy, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 119,
at 171 (discussing an approach where grounds for blocking exchanges are not found in a list or
single principle, but rather in a set of related considerations).
14 There is also some support for this point in the structure of the original Naturalization
Acts, which focused on length of residence, not labor. See, e.g., Naturalization Act of 1802, 2
Stat. 153; Naturalization Act of 1798, I Stat. 566; Naturalization Act of 1790, I Stat. 103.
Naturalization under this view is a process of learning the norms of democracy, not an exchange
of citizenship for labor. Of course residence restrictions also had negative meanings designed to
exclude people whose political views were undesirable, such as pro-Jeffersonian "Jacobins"
from the 1790s and socialists in the late-nineteenth century. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC
IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 153, 370-71 (1997).
135 See James W. Fox Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The
Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 123-49 (1996) (presenting a positive de-
fense of welfare from a theory of liberal citizenship).
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is corrupted when it is bartered. Thus the exchange relations of
the market dominate the citizenship relations of democratic poli-
tics.
Alternatively, one might follow Macneil and reply that poli-
tics is itself an exchange and can best be analyzed from a broad
relational theory of exchange. Under this view, democratic "nego-
tiation" or "discourse" represents an exchange of power, rights,
and recognitions, even if the exchange is not economic.' 36 Yet, to
the extent that the concept of exchange operates more broadly than
economic exchange, as it does in Macneil's capacious theory, 37 it
remains an inadequate rubric to account for the non-exchange as-
pects of the citizenship relation for several reasons. First,
Macneil's use of the terms "contract" and "exchange" carry with
them the unwanted (for Macneil) refuse of economic meanings
even when re-configured in Macneil's theory as non-economic
terms. As he does with many terms,' 38 Macneil attempts to restate
exchange and contract in ways that explicate his broad, Durk-
heimian social theory. But one cannot cleanse language of its ori-
gins or communal meanings. By asking us to think about ex-
change as a focus of human relations, Macneil's theory turns us in
the direction of economic relations even if Macneil would rather
we look elsewhere. It also inherently limits our attention to situa-
tions in which the non-exchange aspects of human relations domi-
nate, and in which the norms governing the relations derive from
non-exchange social constructs.
To illustrate this point, allow me two banal examples of "ex-
changes." Two people can exchange goods, perhaps a shirt and a
pair of shoes. Two others exchange pleasantries. The former ex-
change may be predominately economic or material, the latter en-
tirely social. It might be possible to understand the first relation-
ship reasonably well by focusing on the relation as an exchange,
but the second requires discussion of the non-exchange relations.
Were the parties friends? Neighbors? Classmates? Strangers rec-
ognizing each other's equal status as citizens? The exchange tells
little about what they are, and certainly little about how they
should behave. What may be a pleasantry between friends might
136 See, e.g., Macneil, POLITICAL EXCHANGE, supra note 7.
137See, e.g., Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 7, at 485; Macneil, Many Futures,
supra note 7, at 700. I thank Ian Macneil for getting me to think more carefully about this as-
pect of his theory, even if I ultimately disagree with him on some of the substantive conse-
quences.
1"8"[Macneil's] normative schema is rather elaborate and expressed in terms to which




be offensive over-familiarity between neighbors or strangers. The
norms of the interaction are not those inherent in the exchange.
Indeed, the same can be said of the former example. As Macneil's
theory rightly suggests, we need to look at the "transaction" (trans-
action here standing for material exchange) in context. What if the
exchange was one of gifts between cousins? If so, the norms for
evaluating whether this is a good exchange will depend primarily
on non-exchange values of family and social custom. 39 While the
exchange may be a particular instance in those relations, it does
not produce the norms of the relations. We do not understand the
relationship or the norms governing the relationship without un-
derstanding their socially constituted roles and how those roles
relate to each other.
The problem, then, is one of focus. By concentrating on ex-
change as the source of norms for human relations, Macneil's the-
ory underplays, sometimes dramatically, the non-exchange norms
(or what he sometimes calls supracontract norms).14  Moreover,
given the cultural associations of materiality and economics with
terms such as contract and exchange, Macneil's theory, as applied
by others, may well have a tendency to return to the material ex-
change norms, as happens with the more narrow relational theo-
ries.
This problem of focus and undervaluing of non-exchange
norms is particularly critical for questions of democratic citizen-
ship. First, we still need distinctions between exchanges of power
in the political realm and exchanges of money. Without such dis-
tinctions, there is less of a basis for objecting to the domination of
one by the other, and the norms particular to political relations eas-
ily devolve into the norms of the market. Following Walzer, we
should recognize that money and material exchange can easily
colonize politics and democracy.' 4' As suggested above, the rhe-
torical or social meanings of terms such as contract and exchange
'39 It should be noted that Macneil would likely argue that family and other social relations
have very significant exchange-based norms, and that some norms I would identify as founded
in non-exchange principles Macneil would view as exchange-based.
1) Cf Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 132, 145-57 (1995). Kastely presents a related sympathetic critique of rela-
tional contract theory, arguing that it "is not helpful ... in addressing the practices of exploita-
tion, powerlessness, and marginalization .... " Id. at 153. My argument is that democratic
citizenship theory does provide a means of addressing these concerns, in part by promoting the
preconditions for effective choice, such as options for role differentiation, which Kastely cites
favorably. id. at 180.
141 WALZER, supra note 119, at 282 (discussing colonization of state power); id. at 295-
303 (discussing the illegitimacy of property and money overtaking the state and democracy).
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do not allow us to separate political and market norms, and may
even tend to press political norms towards market ideals.
Second, just as exchange norms cannot comprehend friend-
ship or family norms in the examples above, they also cannot ac-
count for the norms of democratic citizenship. The basic liberal
idea of fundamental rights, wherein each citizen has some baseline
level of rights that are inalienable and unmarketable even if that
person gives her fully competent and informed consent, 142 cannot
be explained from a theory of exchange. So too with the ideals of
equal respect, equal treatment, and inherent human dignity. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., was not seeking exchange on the steps of the
Lincoln Memorial; he was asserting a citizenship right and making
claims for respect and dignity, socially, politically, and legally.1
43
While one could analyze King's claims and those of the civil rights
movement generally from an exchange perspective, this would be
to miss the more central normative claims and aspirations.'44 The
norms of democratic citizenship cannot be understood from a
wholly exchange-based theory, even one as open as Macneil's.
Indeed, it is precisely the point of a Walzerian democratic
theory to foster the proliferation of multiple norm structures and
communities. As discussed above, this type of pluralistic democ-
ratic citizenship theory recognizes that norms arise through differ-
ent types of human interrelations. Some of these may be based
predominantly on material exchanges, some based mostly on non-
material exchange, and others based mostly on non-exchange rela-
tions. Moreover, exchange relations may have an important, al-
though lesser, role to play in non-exchange relations, such as the
family; a plurality of norms within spheres of human relations is
certainly possible. The variety of norms and norm communities is
itself valued under this democratic citizenship theory.
142 The necessity of presuming some baseline of liberal democratic rights and principles,
even in a theory as communal or cultural as Walzer's, is discussed in Joseph H. Carens, Com-
plex Justice, Cultural Difference, and Political Community, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND
EQUALITY, supra note 119, 45, 58-59.
43 It may also help to illustrate this point to consider the different approaches to claims of
black democratic citizenship made by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois. Washing-
ton's approach was that of exchange: he was willing to sacrifice political and social rights in
order to gain some basic economic rights. DuBois on the other hand asserted recognition and
baseline rights of membership, in particular voting and education rights, not as an exchange but
as a basic aspect of citizenship. For DuBois's views on this distinction, see DuBois, supra note
116, at 25-35.
14 Note that this is not to say that all of the norms identified by Macneil as contract or ex-
change norms are irrelevant. Restraint of power, solidarity, reciprocity, and others will be rele-
vant in other spheres as well, including politics. But these norms have a different context, and
other norms, like dignity and recognition, will be more central.
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Here we come to the central point of a relational conception
of democratic citizenship: citizenship is a sphere or relationship
separate and distinct from (though not uninfluenced by) other
spheres or relations, and it has its own guiding principles. 145 Citi-
zens relate to the state qua citizens, and the democratic state owes
its existence, and is justified by its relationship, to the citizenry.
While the state can certainly act in ways distinct from its relation
to citizens and its role as a democratic state, its most important and
necessary function is to relate to its citizens, to protect them and
ensure their prosperity, and to provide security and general wel-
fare.
Democratic citizenship has as its core values of equality and
human dignity. 46  These are the values which the state should
promote and protect, both within its own relationship with citizens,
and, more importantly for our purposes, as fundamental principles
across other relational spheres. Thus, if equal citizenship is threat-
ened by market distributions of money and power - for instance by
establishing the price of labor below a minimum threshold neces-
sary for survival, or by allowing health and safety conditions to
deteriorate to the point of threatening worker well-being - the state
has a role in interfering with market norms or employment norms
to secure worker security and well-being. Indeed, the connection
between citizenship and labor reveals particularly important as-
pects of democratic citizenship, as I shall explore more below.
The theory of democratic citizenship that I advocate also as-
serts an affirmative concept of the self, albeit one that is both
somewhat thin and does not claim to be comprehensive. The de-
mocratic citizen, under this approach, is not merely a political be-
ing. She exists as a richly textured modern who is most fully de-
veloped and free when she has the realistic option of exploring
several spheres of social activity, when her self exists in multiple
sub-communities.147 This theory recognizes both the capacity of
individuals to choose these relations and the social constructions
14 This conception owes much to Michael Walzer's SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 119.
Walzer uses the metaphor of spheres to describe the different types of distributive principles he
locates in different types of human activity. My emphasis is on the relationships that constitute
what Walzer might see as distributive spheres, and on the norms governing those relations. This
may sometimes overlap with Walzer's spheres and with his ideas about just distributions of
goods, but it is meant to be a somewhat different concept.
146 See Fox, supra note 135, at 123-49, and sources cited therein at nn.95-96.
147 For a statement of the importance of social differentiation to freedom, autonomy, and
the role of the State, see DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 165-
75 (1989) (applying individual differentiation principles to government institutions and other
authority figures, and differentiating autonomy from freedom).
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of the self which bound and otherwise influence these choices.
48
The attractiveness of such a theory, it seems to me, is precisely
this view of people as multifaceted, as existing in multiple sub-
communities with multiple sets of norms, yet as also having core
values in their basic political relations. 149 This type of democratic
citizenship theory therefore posits a conception of the self some-
what similar to Macneil's conception of the self which is simulta-
neously selfish and social.
50
Indeed, the perspective of democratic citizenship contains the
potential to bridge a chasm in Macneil's theories of contract rela-
tions and bureaucracy. We have already seen that Macneil views
the self as both wholly individual and wholly communal. For
Macneil, the former has been overly emphasized in the United
States, to the point of an excessive reliance on principles such as
individual equality before the law, leading to an over-
rationalization resulting in excess law and excess bureaucracy.'
5 1
Macneil advocates a shift in emphasis toward communities which,
in his view, can instill values more important than equality - val-
ues such as communal duties, reciprocity, and a sense of belong-
ing.152  While this may at first blush appear anti-liberal, Macneil
seems sympathetic to the concept of citizenship to the extent it en-
compasses community rather than individual rights. 153 Democratic
citizenship bridges these two polls because it emphasizes the indi-
vidual's membership in communities, including, but not limited to,
the political-juridical community. Democratic citizenship advo-
cates a rich civil society where no single bureaucracy dominates,
and where space for multiple small social networks or communi-
ties can flourish. 154  Macneil's value of "belonging" is precisely
what equal democratic citizenship seeks. 1
55
148This is why the democratic citizenship theory advanced here is properly seen as rela-
tionalist. Macneil shows some sympathy with a different variation of democratic theory, what
he labels liberal pragmatism. Liberal pragmatism, according to Macneil, is a theory about the
proper role and actions of the modem democratic state and has influenced Arthur Corbin, Karl
Llewellyn, and Lawrence Tribe, among others, including legislatures and lawyers. Macneil
observes, however, that such an approach is at bottom based on individualistic, market ideas of
the self. Macneil, Challenges and Queries, supra note 7, at 882-83 & n.28.
149 Another attraction is the vision of equality. One of Walzer's greatest contributions was
to emphasize the importance of complex equality, an equality across spheres that accounts for
different inequalities within each sphere but then also seeks to balance inequalities so that each
citizen has some spheres where she can have status and perhaps power. See supra text accom-
panying notes 121 and 128 (discussing complex equality).
'50 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
151 Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 84, at 912.
152 Id. at 935-36.
'-.3 See id. at 941 n. 160 (citing favorably Karl Marx's critique of the French Revolution as
insufficiently attentive to communal man-as-citizen and overly attentive to man-as-individual).
154 See, e.g., Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL
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To illustrate, consider that people engage in multiple social
relationship networks: family, school, political, employment, con-
sumer. 56  Each of these calls for a different social role. Each of
these social roles is embedded in and created by a sub-community
with norms and practices and understandings unique to that sub-
community. A theory of democratic personhood in a pluralistic
democracy should enable people to engage in these spheres of rela-
tions, and to achieve differing levels of values in each sphere.
Thus, democratic citizenship theory recognizes precisely the sort
of multiplicity of social interactions that relational contract theory
often emphasizes. The work that relational contract theory has
done in trying to shift contract law toward recognition of relational
norms fits rather nicely with at least some versions of plural de-
mocratic theory.
Democratic citizenship theory, however, asks more of us than
merely identifying the norms or values inherent in spheres of so-
cial interaction. Where relational contract theories stop, democ-
ratic citizenship theories march on. Most importantly democratic
citizenship theory asks us to view the citizenship relationship as to
some degree centralizing, and to see the state as guarding and
regulating the borders of other spheres. 57  Where relational con-
tract theories are often immersed in particular relations, or, in
Macneil's case, in concentric circles of exchange relations, democ-
ratic citizenship theory is meta-relational; it seeks to understand
the relations of relations, with the effect on individual citizens be-
ing a connecting point for this study.
The basic problem, therefore, from the point of view of de-
mocratic citizenship, is what David Miller calls "dominance" : 
58
that power in one sphere, while perhaps legitimated under the
DEMOCRACY 89 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992) (using 'civil society' to describe a society of unco-
erced human interactions and a network of relationships); Michael Walzer, A Better Vision: The
Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, 38 DISSENT 293 (1991) (discussing mod-
em civil society in the context of state and national governments and the economy). For an
interesting discussion of the possible importance of civil society to democratic freedom in the
context of contract law and adhesion contracts, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1238-43 (1983).
155 See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989) (discussing nationhood
and the concept of equal citizenship as a unifying ideal); Miller, Complex Equality, supra note
121, at 206-07 (discussing the importance of equality of status and citizenship).
156 Macneil recognizes this multiplicity, though to a different effect. See Macneil, POLITI-
CAL EXCHANGE, supra note 7, at 164-65 (recognizing the electorate as functioning in "multiple
capacities as citizens, workers, taxpayers, and beneficiaries of government programs").
'57 See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Exclusion, Injustice, and the Democratic State, 40 DISSENT
55, 63 (1993) [hereinafter Walzer, Exclusion] (discussing the role of the state in limiting market
or religious dominance outside their spheres).
1'8 Miller, Complex Equality, supra note 121, at 203.
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norms of that sphere, may produce power across other spheres, and
so reduce the general capacity for citizens to enjoy a range of
goods and statuses. Equality across spheres requires a complex
view of equality, where people who have less power or status
within one sphere can balance this by having greater power or
status in other spheres. The line workers at a factory assembly
plant can enjoy an equality status within her family and perhaps a
leadership role in local politics. As Walzer emphasizes, "[w]hat a
larger conception of justice requires is not that citizens rule and are
ruled in turn, but that they rule in one sphere and are ruled in an-
other - where 'rule' means not that they exercise power but that
they enjoy a greater share than other people of whatever good is
being distributed."
59
If, however, a person's power and status within one sphere -
the market being the most likely - grants that person power in
politics, in education, and in other areas, there is little chance that
citizens can benefit from a plurality of relational spheres. Fur-
thermore, if the citizen is subjected to overriding inequality - such
as gender discrimination - her capacity to experience complex
equality, even where the discrimination is absent in some spheres,
will be greatly diminished. 160 The state plays a critical role in pre-
venting such domination and ensuring the existence of complex
equality. The democratic state can properly do this not just be-
cause it has power or democratic legitimacy, but because it is the
one relational sphere where the values and norms of equality and
human dignity govern. There is only one citizenship: equal citi-
zenship. 6 1 Because the democratic state has a particular norma-
tive concern with equal citizenship, it is the best source for pre-
venting domination across spheres by a party who gains success in
a particular sphere. This concern is most relevant for the domina-
tion possible in the market by concentrated wealth, which can
translate easily into domination in politics, in education, and in
other social relations. 1
62
15)WALZER, supra note 119, at 321.
10 Walzer has recognized the importance of state action to prevent exclusion and discrimi-
nation and so foster complex equality: "given the continued existence of excluded groups, the
state must play a larger role in advancing the cause of complex equality than I envisaged for it
when I wrote [SPHERES OF JUSTICE]." Walzer, Exclusion, supra note 157, at 56.
'6 See KARST, supra note 155, at 3; Miller, Complex Equality, supra note 121, at 204-09;
Miller, Introduction, supra note 121, at 12-13; Michael Rustin, Equality in Post-Modern Times,
in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 119, at 17, 41 ("If structures of political
decision-making are democratic, and based on equal citizenship, there is some likelihood that
other forms of power will be kept within bounds."). I have previously argued that the estab-
lishment of equal citizenship and elimination of a tradition of tiered ideas of citizenship was one
of the (not fully realized) goals of Reconstruction. See Fox, supra note 112.
162 See WALZER, supra note 119, at 106, 295-303; Miller, Complex Equality, supra note
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By seeing the state and the citizenship relation as a source for
policing domination across other relational spheres, we can more
fully address some of the key problems raised in relational contract
theory. In particular, Macneil repeatedly emphasizes his contract
norms of power relations and mutuality and the problems inherent
in the imbalances caused to these norms by modern society and
law. Yet he fails to credit actions of the state (both legislative and
judicial) which seek to balance power relations and support greater
mutuality.163  An examination of a few areas of law may help to
illustrate how democratic citizenship theory can both frame and
supplement relational contract theory.
C. Examples
1. Anti-Discrimination Law
Relational contract theories have difficulty discussing anti-
discrimination laws. The tendency is to identify the general social
norm against discrimination, often expressed through statute, and,
taking it as a social fact, explore its effect on contract law, contract
behavior, and contract norms.164 But non-discrimination principles
are at least as deep and important as the norms of contract and
should clearly sometimes trump and alter contract relational
norms. The employment norms of pre-1964 America should have
been shaken up and revised. Prior to the civil rights revolution,
employment was understood within its own sphere as properly dis-
121, at 212-13; Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY 315,
321-22 (1984) (discussing how market success can cause inequalities of wealth that create coer-
civeness; organized market powers can generate command and obedience similar to a govern-
ment; and wealth and ownership easily convert into government power). For a sensitive analy-
sis of the complexities of the values of "money" for Walzer's theory, see Jeremy Waldron,
Money and Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY, supra note 119, at 143.
163 As I have indicated, Macneil's failure to credit the role of the democratic state is based
in large part on his view of the state as incapable. Most recently he has argued that the power
and willingness of democratic states to control private institutions, especially on the interna-
tional level, has been greatly diminished. Macneil, Contracting Worlds, supra note 7, at 436.
Obviously I am far more sanguine about the potential of the democratic state than is Macneil.
14 See, e.g., Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of
the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 337, 399 (1986) (viewing anti-
discrimination laws as an external force affecting the employment contract relationship).
Macneil mentions anti-discrimination law as being itself relational contract law, but the implica-
tion is that it implements relational contract norms. See Macneil, Challenges and Queries,
supra note 7, at 897. Under his theory, such laws can be seen both as addressing the power and
reciprocity norms of contract, and as representing the social norms external to contract. To the
extent anti-discrimination principles are understood as based in contract norms, Macneil fails to
capture their central role in democratic citizenship; to the extent they are understood as external,
Macneil treats them as do other relational theorists - as external social facts understood primar-
ily for their empirical value. Cf Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 7, at 506-07 (suggest-
ing that discrimination law presents one of many complexities in contract relations which prom-
ise-oriented theories of contract cannot adequately address).
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criminatory - a norm that applied to employers and employees
alike (witness the strong support for racist employment polices
among white unions). Discrimination was the custom of the rela-
tionship. Similarly, it was consistent with the norms of both legal
employment and legal education to prohibit women from attending
law school or practicing with major law firms.
So long as our focus is on norms internal to particular rela-
tions, or even Macneil's broader contractual norms, it is not clear
that there is any justification for state imposition of anti-
discrimination law. Indeed, one could argue that anti-
discrimination law injures contract norms because it forces the par-
ties - the white male employer and the white male employees - to
violate their own norms, including consent. There may even be a
tendency to focus more on lost solidarity and other relational
norms than on the benefits of gender or racial equality.165  The
Macneilian relationalist would probably respond, with Paul Gudel,
that anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, implement the norms of reciprocity and power-
structuring and so support contract-as-it-should-be. 66  But these
norms seem indeterminate if understood only as contract norms.
Hiring or promoting a woman or minority just as surely destroys
the reciprocity norms enabled by historic discrimination - the re-
ciprocity within the white male culture - as it does promote a so-
cietal "reciprocity" or balancing of power across genders and
classes. The norm of power restraint, which would suggest limita-
tions on unilateral power, also fails to explain these laws, since
this norm cannot adequately distinguish among legitimate power
differences and those that should be prohibited. Why, for instance,
should the state play a greater role in preventing gender discrimi-
nation than in regulating employment more generally?
Ultimately, there is something odd about viewing the civil
rights legislation as involving primarily norms of contract power
relations rather than as implementing norms of democratic citizen-
ship. The racial and gendered discriminatory norms of employ-
ment and other contract relations should change not because the
111 As Eric Posner has noted, there is a coercive side to solidarity: when the state promotes
a solidarity relationship it also necessarily permits more abuse within the relationship than it
would permit among strangers; yet when the state intervenes to prevent abuse it disturbs the
solidarity of healthy relations as well. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence
of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 133, 190 (1996). The
question therefore is when the state's intervention is justified. From the view of democratic
citizenship it is almost certainly justified to disturb the solidarity of families in order to prevent
systemic abuses of women and children. My point is that this answer must come from a norma-
tive perspective outside the relationship.66 Gudel, supra note 7, at 785.
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solidarity of contract exchange was threatened, but because de-
mocratic citizens should not suffer racial and gender discrimina-
tion. The foundational statement of the twentieth century oppos-
ing the norm of racial segregation, Brown v. Board of Education,
was a statement about equal citizenship based on the Fourteenth
Amendment. 67  It is the state's particular place in society as the
implementing agency for democratic citizenship that not only al-
lows, but requires it to address inequalities across other spheres.
The principles of non-discrimination which motivated the civil
rights era do not arise out of some deep-rooted norm of contract
exchange or from some generalized social norm identifiable
through careful sociological observation; rather they exist at the
foundation of democratic citizenship and are part of the very basis
of law and government in a democratic society.168  Democratic
theory, with its emphasis on broadly based conceptions of equal
opportunity, equal treatment, and the basic equality of human dig-
nity, provides contract theory with the basis for these principles.
While state enforcement of equal citizenship may increase social
solidarity, equality nevertheless trumps general solidarity; it is not
a sufficient argument against anti-discrimination laws to argue that
such laws would produce a loss in social solidarity (even if one
could define and measure such a concept). Furthermore, when the
state speaks and enforces the language of equal worth and dignity,
it helps create equal dignity in society, and so can change the
norms of other areas, such as discriminatory employment. 169 State
167 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Jack Balkin has observed that there are two related, but distinct,
visions of the principle animating Brown: anti-subordination (also called equal citizenship) and
anti-classification (also called color-blindness). Jack K. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education:
A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 1, 1I
(Jack K. Balkin, ed.) (2001); see also id. at 55-57. 1 adopt the anti-subordination reading. On
the importance of Brown for establishing a modem American cultural ideal and norm of equal
democratic citizenship, see KARST, supra note 155, at 15-27; Balkin, "Revised Opinion," in
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 77-91; Jack K. Balkin &
Sanford Levison, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1099-
1100 (2001) (discussing equal citizenship as a foundational constitutional and political princi-
ple).
65 In the context of Macneil's contract norms the problem may be that he seeks to locate
reciprocity and power-structuring as contract norms, whereas they may be better understood as
norms of democratic citizenship.
169 In this way democratic citizenship can overcome a learned or socialized perception of
inequality. For instance, a lower-income consumer may "feel" inferior and so be more willing
to accept onerous contract terms. Indeed, the fact that contract law often enforces onerous bar-
gains itself creates this self-perception. If the state speaks, however, in ways that reinforce the
consumer's self-worth, the consumer may be more willing to assert his or her interests. See,
e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. &
MARY. L. REV. 445, 482-84 (1994) ("[A] belief that individuals are of equal moral worth may
lead one to believe that he need not take a smaller share of the surplus created by exchanges.").
On the role of democratic citizenship and law in creating a society of equal dignity and worth,
see Fox, supra note 135, at 137, and sources cited therein at notes 152-53. This point is related
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creation of equal citizenship may in this way also create a better
structure of solidarity than the one it replaces. By adding a rela-
tional theory of democratic citizenship to relational contract the-
ory, we can better account for the important role for democrati-
cally based principles such as non-discrimination in contract rela-
tions and contract law.
70
2. Labor
As mentioned above, labor is a critical intersection for con-
tract and democracy. The labor relation is both contractual and
essential to citizenship. The area of labor thus provides a key
point to explore how a democratic citizenship theory can advance
relational contract theory. Macneil posits that labor law in the
twentieth century shifted from viewing the labor relation in dis-
crete terms, focusing on the basics of consent (essentially the
Lochner Era), to addressing the mutuality and power imbalances
within the labor relation through modern labor legislation and
regulation.' 7' He sees this as a shift in favor of relational contract
norms, although he views the move with suspicion because labor
laws have also had the effect of creating a new protected class of
union managers 172 and the employed generally. 
73
Macneil's understanding of labor law as a species of contract
law highlights one of the most important insights of relational con-
tract theory: neoclassical contract law has improperly carved out
large sections of contract law which are inconveniently relational
and now treats them as distinct areas of law. This has happened
with labor law, insurance, corporate law, family law, and many
other areas.174  According to Paul Gudel, this division occurs
to the study of the expressive functions of law. See supra note 72.
70°Paul Gudel contends that Macneil's theory provides an essential advantage over "lib-
eral" theories of contract which focus on the overly vague concept of "fairness," because rela-
tional contract theory requires a particularization of fairness within the context of the exchange
and also balances fairness with other contract norms. Gudel, supra note 7, at 782-83 (citing
Charles Fried as the main proponent of the liberal theory). To the extent Gudel means to cri-
tique Rawlsian views, he undervalues the extent to which liberal theories in fact have very de-
veloped conceptions of fairness-in-action. See id. at 781. It is very hard to argue that Rawls'
theory is insufficiently developed in its conception of fairness, even when it remains rather
abstract. If one then combines the later Rawlsian idea of liberalism as primarily political with a
Walzerian interest in placing the political within the context of other spheres of social relations,
one can, I think, overcome the problem Gudel addresses.
171 MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 87.
172 Id. at 89-90.
173 Id. at 139 n.29 (suggesting that minimum wage laws increase the "gap in wealth" be-
tween the employed and the unemployed).
'74See Gudel, supra note 7, at 778 (pointing out that classical contract law has tended to
"spin off' specialty areas such as labor/management relations); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 617 (1983) (discussing the division of
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"partly because we think of contract law as implementing and en-
forcing the world of private agreements, while labor law and fam-
ily law are statutorily based public law, permeated and informed
by public policies imposed on these relations by the body politic
acting through its representatives."'' 75 Relational contract theory
suggests that this split can be harmonized by understanding such
areas of public law not as primarily imposing external norms, but
as seeking to "facilitate reciprocity, solidarity and the other con-
tract norms.' 76
As with anti-discrimination law, it is also rather odd to view
labor legislation as operating primarily within Macneil's contract
norms. William Forbath has shown that the labor movement was a
movement about membership in the democratic society, 177 and the
brief discussion above about Reconstruction suggests that labor
has played a crucial role in defining modern American democratic
citizenship. The state regulation of the employment relationship
exists not simply because of a power imbalance or the need to fos-
ter contract norms of reciprocity, but because of a power imbal-
ance in an area critical for citizenship. Control over one's labor
(free labor), and protections against having one's labor relation
itself become controlling or life-threatening (wage, hour, and
safety regulation), are critical to a democratic citizen's being able
to be a citizen in the first place. As Judith Shklar so rightly ob-
served:
The opportunity to work and to be paid an earned reward for
one's labor was a social right, because it was a primary
source of public respect. It was seen as such, however, not
only because it was a defiant cultural and moral departure
from the corrupt European past, but also because paid labor
separated the free man from the slave.
178
Work constitutes our identity as democratic citizens, our
membership in our national and local community, and our sense of
independence and self-worth. 79 There can be a dramatic differ-
traditional contract law into many disparate segments); see also supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text (discussing "carving out" of contract law areas).
1
75 Gudel, supra note 7, at 780.
176 Id.
177 See William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1793-1804
(1994) [hereinafter Forbath, Rights Talk] (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993)).
17 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1-2 (1991).
1
7
9See Vicki Schulz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (discussing
the importance of work to the individual's citizenship, community, and identity); see also Ken-
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ence between protection of citizen labor and protection of contrac-
tual reciprocity and power relations more generally. When the
state acts to protect labor, through broadly applicable labor and
workplace laws, it acts in favor of citizenship; different - and
lesser - concerns are present when the state acts to protect car
dealers in their dealer-manufacturer relations. Absent some theory
about the proper role of the state, relational contract theory cannot
adequately explain such differences.
To understand how thinking in terms of the democratic citi-
zenship relation can help us understand the state's role in contract
law, it may help to consider two labor and employment cases used
by relationalists Gudel and Macneil to illustrate their approach. In
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., the plaintiff, a fired employee,
argued for applying the tort of bad faith breach of contract to the
employment contract. 80 The California courts had an established
tort of bad faith breach of contract in insurance law,' 8' but they had
not expanded it beyond the insurance contract relation. The court
in Foley decided, 4-3, not to do so. Paul Gudel contrasts the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions and suggests that the dissent gets the
case right because it applies a relational analysis:
[T]he majority regards employment as a relation that only has
value in the separable economic 'products' that the employee
gets out of it, while the dissenters think about employment as
a relation that has an inherent, non-commercial value for the
employee. The dissenters suggest that employees find value
in the activity of the job itself, thus making the relation seem,
at least partly, more like the non-commercial insurance con-
tract.
82
Gudel keenly analyzes this case as important for understand-
ing the relational perspective. The dispute between the majority
and minority, however, can also be considered a dispute about the
proper role of the court in a democracy. The majority distin-
guishes employment from insurance on the basis that insurance is
"quasi-public" and provides a "public service." 183 The courts can
properly regulate insurance, according to the majority, because
neth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
523, 530-53 (1997) (asserting that work is a source of identity and self-worth).
180765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
'8' See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); see generally
ROBERT H. JERRY, I1, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G (3d ed. 2002) (discussing "In-
surers' Liability for Bad Faith").
182 Gudel, supra note 7, at 791.
'
83 Foley, 765 P.2d at 396.
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insurance serves a particular function for the state. This view of
insurance ultimately sees consumers of insurance as more than just
consumers: they are consumers of a public good and their charac-
ter as democratic citizens is implicated by the insurance contract in
a way not true of the consumption of widgets or a contract for yard
services. The "public" role of insurance in fact justifies both the
extensive regulation of the field by the legislatures and the inde-
pendent, overlapping regulation of the insurance contract relation
by the courts. For the majority in Foley, however, such public
functions do not exist for employment.
The dissent counters, as Gudel observes, with an eloquent
statement of the importance to the employee of the employment
relationship, of how employment is not like other market transac-
tions. 84 The dissent's description of the value of employment is
particularly intriguing: "One's work obviously involves more than
just earning a living. It defines for many people their identity,
their sense of self-worth, their sense of belonging.' 85 For the dis-
sent, this justifies the court's implementation of the bad faith tort
as an effort to remedy a serious harm: "The wrongful and mali-
cious destruction of one's employment is far more certain to result
in serious emotional distress than any wrongful denial of an insur-
ance claim."''
86
It is important here to see how the majority and dissent are
talking past one another. The majority is looking to justify court
action in the "publicness" of the activity; the dissent is looking for
a significant, tort-like harm to invoke the court's power to remedy
private harms. Ultimately, the relational contract theorist cannot
bridge these two discourses. Gudel seems to favor the dissent's
approach because it focuses on the nature of the relationship be-
tween the parties. It is hard, however, to see how this avoids the
Gilmorian problem that Gudel earlier raised of having contract de-
volve into tort. If one legitimizes a court's interference with con-
tract on the basis of a court's general authority to remedy torts,
then Gilmore may have been right.
Democratic citizenship can resolve this problem. It provides
a means of connecting the harm to the employee to the publicness
of an activity. The state has a particular concern with employment
precisely because employment is so central to the citizen's sense
of self-worth as a citizen and belonging in the democratic commu-
nity. Injury to the employee is in fact not like harms in other con-
184 Id. at 415 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
185 Id. This section is highlighted by Gudel. Gudel, supra note 7, at 790-91.
'81, Foley, 765 P.2d at 415.
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tract breaches because those harms may not implicate the party's
citizen-status. Employment is a candidate for application of doc-
trines of good faith in ways that other contract relations are not.
The employer serves a public function. The dissent focuses too
much on the individual or private effects of employment; the rela-
tionalist focuses too much on the relationship between the em-
ployee and the employer. Democratic citizenship theory expands
these perspectives to capture the publicness of private employment
and so can connect employment and insurance more effectively.
87
We can also see the potential of a relational approach which
accounts for democratic citizenship in providing an alternative un-
derstanding of a rather old case highlighted by Ian Macneil, Ed-
ward G. Budd Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB.188 In this case the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reinstated an employee who
had been fired for working for a union, and the Court of Appeals
enforced the NLRB's reinstatement order.' 89  First let us look at
the portion of the appellate opinion quoted by Macneil:
The case of Walter Weigand is extraordinary. If ever a
workman deserved summary discharge it was he. He was
under the influence of liquor while on duty. He came to
work when he chose and he left the plant and his shift as he
pleased. In fact, a foreman on one occasion was agreeably
surprised to find Weigand at work and commented upon it.
Weigand amiably stated that he was enjoying it. He brought
a woman (apparently generally known as "Duchess") to the
rear of the plant yard and introduced some of the employees
to her. He took another employee to visit her and when this
man got too drunk to be able to go home, punched his time-
card for him and put him on the table in the representatives'
meeting room in the plant in order to sleep off his intoxica-
tion. Weigand's immediate superiors demanded again and
again that he be discharged, but each time officials inter-
187 Some readers may recoil at the idea of a court-imposed good faith obligation in an em-
ployment contract as being an ex post attempt to implement democratic values, whereas legisla-
tive regulation of contract terms, which happens prior to contracting, would be less offensive
and more consistent with principles of individual contractual consent (the latter simply being a
way of setting the field of play prior to the game, rather than changing the rules during or after
the game). In response I would observe, first, that I view court and jury determinations as po-
tentially important expressions of democratic principles and do not necessarily assume priority
for individual consent, and, second, that the contextualized view of contract that relational theo-
ries adopt would reject as artificial the characterization of court-imposed good faith duties as
being ex post - the duty exists before and during the transaction; the court simply enforces it. I
thank my "'formalist" colleague, Jack Graves, for raising this point.
18s 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943). Macneil discusses this case in Macneil, Values in Contract,
supra note 7, at 370-72.
189 Edward G. Budd Manuf., 138 F.2d at 86-90.
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vened on Weigand's behalf because as was naively stated he
was "a representative" [of a company union]. In return for
not working at the job for which he was hired, the petitioner
gave him full pay and on five separate occasions raised his
wages. [Only one of these was a general pay increase given
to other employees.] 190
Now let us look at Macneil's discussion:
In spite of the foregoing description of Weigand, the Court of
Appeals enforced the NLRB's order of reinstatement. One
may either be outraged at the imposition of such an employee
on a business, or think the order served the employer right, or
both. But it is clear that the NLRB's and the court's imposi-
tion on the employer of Weigand as an employee reflects
very different values from the employer's original retention
of him. The upper management originally viewed him as
supplying services sufficiently valuable to warrant his reten-
tion, thereby satisfying the norm of reciprocity as they saw it.
Once Weigand "joined the other side" and hence no longer
served his theretofore useful function for management, they,
entirely correctly, no longer believed that any individual re-
ciprocity would be achieved. While the voluntary retention
of Weigand reflected the reciprocity norm as applied to a
single employee, the sovereign imposition of Weigand as an
employee reflected at least three, and perhaps four, norms.
These were the reciprocity norm applied collectively, the
contractual solidarity norm, the restraint to power norm, and
perhaps some unidentified supracontract norms. The result,
however, unless Weigand mended his ways or was success-
fully fired for not doing so, was not a contractual relation be-
tween the employer and Weigand as an individual. Rather, it
was a private welfare scheme imposed on the employer as a
means of policing the National Labor Relations Act.19
Macneil's purpose is to illustrate how the state's imposition of
norms on the contract relation transforms the norms of contract.
This is important, and represents a significant and necessary meth-
odology for thinking about how the state can affect contract rela-
tions and implement non-contractual norms and principles. The
problem, however, is that Macneil analyzes the state's action as
the imposition of contract norms on the relationship; the external-
ity is that of the actor, not the norm-type. He contrasts the internal
19'Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 371 (quoting Edward G. Budd Manuf,
138 F.2d at 90 (original footnotes omitted by Macneil, bracketed additions by Macneil)).
"' Id. at 371-72 (footnotes omitted).
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creation of these norms within the employment relation with the
external implementation of contract norms from without the rela-
tion. Notice that the closest he comes to acknowledging a truly
external norm in this context is his reference to supracontract
norms, and even then he minimizes that acknowledgment by stat-
ing that the court is imposing "perhaps some unidentified su-
pracontract norms."'
192
Recall our discussion above of how Macneil's category of
"supracontract norms" really operates as a bin of miscellany for
norms arising outside of the contract relation. Given Macneil's
proclivity to view non-contract norms with suspicion and to see
contract or exchange norms as central, it is natural for him to view
the government's action in the Budd case as both effecting and af-
fecting contract norms. Yet, by forcing the case into his theoreti-
cal structure, Macneil misses what may be the more important
normative aspect of the government's (government consisting of,
in this case, the court, legislature, and administrative agency) ac-
tion: the importance of labor, employment, and union activity to
democratic citizenship.
Consider that the court's opinion, and ultimately the case it-
self, was not primarily about employee Weigand's reinstatement; it
was about company unions. The discussion of Weigand comes at
the end of an opinion in which the court spends most of its discus-
sion reviewing the creation of the company union and addressing
the NLRB's order disestablishing the company union. 193 The court
was predominantly concerned with the employer's favorable
treatment of, and support for, the company union, which operated
to disadvantage the competing unions, including the CIO. In fact,
the court emphasized Weigand's case primarily to point out how
the company union representatives were treated favorably, and, as
the court stated, "[wie can scarcely believe that the petitioner [em-
ployer] would have displayed such an attitude toward officers of
192 Id. at 372 (emphasis added). It is odd for Macneil to describe the supracontract norm as
"unidentified." After all, his contract norms of reciprocity, solidarity, and restraint of power are
not actually identified by the court - it is Macneil who identifies them. Moreover, the main
norms identified by the court were the legal norm of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit-
ing discharge of employees engaging in union activity, and the related labor law norm critiquing
the employer who had, as the court describes the complaint, "foisted a labor organization...
upon its employees ... and dominated its activities." Edward G. Budd Manuf, 138 F.2d at 86,
90-91; see also id. at 90 (affirming the NLRB's decision that the company union was dominated
and controlled by the employer). While these norms may be an example of Macneil's contract
norms, they may also be seen as implementations of the broader democratic norms favoring
employee control over union activity. To the extent that such supracontract norms remain uni-
dentified, it is mainly Macneil who is not identifying them.
193 Edward G. Budd Manuf., 138 F.2d at 86-91.
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an undominated 'adversary' labor organization."'' 94  Macneil
downplays this aspect of the case, which becomes, in Macneil's
analysis, an imposition of collective reciprocity, solidarity, and
power restraint, albeit one he probably condones.
What Macneil views as collective reciprocity, solidarity, and
power restraint, however, can also be seen as a more specific pro-
tection of the employment relationship for the purpose of preserv-
ing the social and political status and capacity of all employees.
This was a case, after all, enforcing the National Labor Relations
Act. 95 Under this Act, the nation had determined, after enormous
democratic struggle, that the preservation of collective reciprocity
and balancing of power in this type of relationship is proper action
for the democratic government. Indeed, the problem with com-
pany unions is, in part, that they interfere with the workers' de-
mocratic participation in the union. "Equal citizenship requires..
. [that citizens] enjoy a measure of democracy at work and in their
economic lives."' 196  It was because private ordering of the em-
ployment relation did not protect the employees' basic necessities
that the federal government had to begin acting in the first place.
Employment in which the employee is capable of protecting his or
her own security is central because of the special role of labor in
our democratic society. Much of the New Deal was about labor as
an expression of citizenship, and about the role of the state in pre-
serving and fostering citizenship through labor. As William For-
bath has shown:
the politicians, lawyers, scholars, and labor leaders who
shaped the New Deal understood reform to entail not merely
economic recovery, but redeeming workers' rights and
identities as citizens. Thus, the Legal Realist Robert Hale
told the Senate Committee on Education and Labor in 1934
that the situation of an employee at a nonunion steel plant
was akin to that of a "non-voting member of a society." And
at the same hearing, Senator Robert Wagner attacked the
existing legal order for "perpetuating in modern industry...
aspects of a [feudal] master-servant relationship." As
194 Id. at 90.
'91 Macneil describes this as "policing the National Labor Relations Act." Macneil, Values
in Contract, supra note 7, at 372. 1 think this description greatly underplays the role and pur-
pose of the Act as protecting, preserving, and creating norms of democratic citizenship.
I" Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 177, at 1792. Cf WALZER, supra note 119, at 295-303
(discussing importance of principles of industrial democracy). By highlighting the historic
development of labor as a potential citizenship right, I do not mean to suggest that the contem-
porary context is no different; problems of globalization, the service and information economy,
etc., raise a host of complex issues not encountered by New Dealers. I do believe, however, that
such topics should not be addressed without due consideration of work as a means of self-
fulfillment and citizenship. I thank Marleen O'Conner for pointing this out.
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citizens, workers deserved "real opportunities to participate
in the determination of economic issues." Echoing labor's
half-century-old refrain, Wagner concluded that "industrial
tyranny" was "incompatible with a republican form of
government." 1
97
The reasons for the state's interference with the labor rela-
tionship at Edward G. Budd's shop are found in the political and
social justifications and norms for enacting the spate of labor leg-
islation of the New Deal - norms of equal, democratic citizenship.
They justify particular state action in particular fields of social and
economic activity. They are a critical component of the context of
the case and may explain the case better than Macneil's contract198
norms.
This is not to say that the interaction of these more general
democratic norms, which justify government action with the inter-
nal contract relational norms that Macneil identifies as essential to
contract, is not far more complex; indeed, a study of how the New
Deal labor legislation interacted with norms of contract would be
fascinating. But the action of the state cannot properly be weighed
in this analysis without seeing it as based on something more par-
ticular, and more normatively significant, than vague "supracon-
tract" norms. Ultimately, Macneil's relational contract theory
stumbles when it fails to credit fully the non-contract norms per-
taining specifically to the democratic state.
Macneil might respond that in fact the state's entry into labor
relations has been far from successful in creating "democratic citi-
zenship." For instance, Macneil correctly notes that "labor union-
ism supported by legal backing of various kinds almost surely cre-
ates a new kind of inequality in society, that between the organized
and the unorganized."' 199 This is a powerful point. I would reply,
however, that even the tensions and distortions present in the legal
protection of labor can be better understood and addressed by ac-
197 Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 177, at 1802 (footnotes omitted); see also William P.
Quigley, The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 139, 143-57 (1998) (discussing New Deal and post-World War II ideas of
work, citizenship, and the state).
198 My argument here amounts to a claim that Macneil's analysis takes insufficient account
of the context of the case. This is ironic, of course, since Macneil's theory is itself the basis for
theories which contextualize our understandings of cases. This highlights my general point that
democratic citizenship is an important omitted context for relational contract analysis.
19' MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 90. For a recent critical explora-
tion of unionism and inequality, particularly inequalities of race and gender, see Marion Crain &
Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks ": Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1542, 1567-1600 (1999) (discussing the disadvantages faced by women and non-whites
in working-class labor markets).
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counting for democratic citizenship theory. Under a theory of
equal citizenship, legal protection of one class or type of worker,
at the expense of other workers or even of non-workers, is a viola-
tion of citizenship principles. When unionism adopted racist poli-
cies, it was the democratic principle of anti-discrimination that
challenged this inequality. 2°° Democratic citizenship theory would
not disagree with Macneil that labor law implemented by the gov-
ernment has had modest success and unintended adverse conse-
quences, but neither would it deny the importance of the efforts to
protect labor and the need to address resulting inequalities, to the
extent they affect other democratic citizens. Moreover, a theory of
democratic citizenship would also focus on the extent to which
privatized labor law - the collective bargain agreement - itself
contributed to the failures of labor law. It may well be the case
that the over-reliance of post-World War II labor on the private
contract to the exclusion of a fully integrated relationship among
the state and labor and management caused the problems identified
by Macneil.2 °'
IV. INTERSECTIONS: How RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY AND
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP THEORY CAN HELP EACH OTHER
One of the problems with relational contract theory identified
above was that it views norms too descriptively and lacks theoreti-
cal support for the norms that drive state activity in a democracy.
Perhaps the most significant benefit provided by an understanding
of democratic citizenship is that it gives us a means of identifying
and talking about how particular types of contract relations are
more important to citizenship than others and are appropriately
subject to higher state monitoring and regulation. In particular,
employment and education, each of which is to a significant de-
gree contractual, are important for the development and mainte-
nance of the "self' conceived of in citizenship theories, as the dis-
cussion of Reconstruction above demonstrates. State regulation of
these relations can be based not on a general acceptance of social
211 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace as Locus of Integration in a Diverse
Society, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 331, 348 (discussing the use of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to fight discrimination).
201 See, e.g. Forbath, Rights Talk, supra note 177. For instance, Forbath asserts
[Tihe New Deal's institutional legacy fell far short of this panoply of social
and economic rights [outlined in President Roosevelt's Bill of Rights], and
FDR's broad rights rhetoric fell into disuse as, after World War fl, the labor
movement came to depend on the 'private welfare state' that unions con-
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norms for these activities, which is how contract relationalists
seem to conceive of extra-contractual norms, but rather from a de-
veloped normative understanding of the role of the state in promot-
ing equal citizenship.20 2 In this section I will explore a few points
where relational and democratic theory overlap and can support
each other.
A. Consent
Democratic citizenship presumes a priority for the liberal idea
of individual rationality and choice. Consent is obviously impor-
tant to democratic principles, since it justifies the use of state
power, including the power to constrain basic freedoms. This ba-
sic idea is consistent with the commonly accepted consent norm of
contract, which is a norm of classical contract law as well as one
of Macneil's norms. It means, however, that democratic principles
will recognize the importance of private ordering in contract, not
just public consent to state action. One of the reasons that democ-
ratic citizenship theory should foster spheres of contractual rela-
tions is that because, as a theory, it values individual choice and
powers of consent. When people fully consent to contract terms,
they have in a sense made law democratically: the "law" of their
relationship has been made by the consent of the governed.2 3
Thus democratic citizenship, by recognizing the value of people
consenting to relations and relational spheres, and by valuing the
multiplicity of spheres, supports a fundamental norm of contract -
that of consent.
However, as a political theory democratic citizenship also le-
gitimizes state action to effectuate political principles based on
consent. When the state interferes with contract rights, there are
two consents at issue: the consent of the private parties in the
transaction, and the political consent of the citizens. In this sense,
contractual consent is contextualized in a broader world of politi-
cal consent.20 4 State "interference" with contractual consent, by
imposing, for instance, wage regulations, actually implements the
consent of the citizenry for the state to promote the general wel-
fare.
202 For an example of this type of analysis in education, see AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION (1987).
203 See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 4, at 530 ("Private law which is made by contract in the
traditional sense is democratic because a traditional contract must be the agreement of both
parties.").




Macneil is well aware of this dual consent concept of what he
defines as liberal theories.2 5 He argues that it is very difficult to
justify contracts of adhesion under liberal consent theory, since the
consumer does not herself consent to terms.20 6  As Macneil ob-
serves, only the more abstract political consent of legislative, ad-
ministrative, or judicial controls, including gap-filling of terms and
invalidation under unconscionability rules, remains plausible.20 7
Macneil also adds to this the more relational idea of abstract con-
sent in that people collectively consent to the general structure of
the consumer economy and the law that facilitates it.
208
By expanding our ways of thinking about consent in these re-
lational and democratic modes, we can recognize some of the ways
collective consent affects contracting. First, there are particular
contracting relations in which the legislative or administrative bod-
ies do write terms: insurance law is the most obvious example,
where insurance commissioners have the authority to review and
209approve standardized terms. If the legislature determines that
the particular relation is significant enough to its citizens, it will
regulate the adhesion contract. The question then becomes what
other types of contracts should the legislature and administrative
agencies regulate. Once we admit that consent is implicated in
such regulation, it becomes easier to address this question openly,
without fear that consent is being undermined at every regulatory
step. As this article suggests, democratic theories might well em-
phasize particular contract relations as more important for public
regulation. The point here, however, is that such determinations
can be made with reference to principles of democratic citizenship
without undermining the other democratic and contract principle of
consent.
Second, courts can serve a democratic function in contract en-
forcement. Consider the doctrine of unconscionability. By think-
ing about collective consent wherein consumers consent to a rea-
sonable consumer economy, the unconscionability doctrine is one
means of enforcing consumer consent to reasonable terms and rec-
ognizing the lack of consent to unreasonable terms. 2 ° In addition,
205 Macneil, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 7, at 5, 7-8.
206 Id. at 7-8.
207 Id. at 8.
208 Id. at 18-22.
201 JERRY, supra note 181, at 119-23. As Jerry notes, states are particularly active in regu-
lating fire insurance terms: "each state mandates the exact wording for the standard fire insur-
ance contract." Id. at 121; see also Friedrich Kessler, Contract of Adhesion - Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943) (discussing courts' policy of
favoring insurance policyholders when interpreting insurance contracts).2 10 See discussion of unconscionability infra pp. 56-63.
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the court is often implementing the legislature's will. In the area
of consumer contracts, it is doing so when it applies the U.C.C.'s
unconscionability provisions, since the legislatures enacted the
language and the court applies it. Yet even outside of statutory
unconscionability law, it is not too much of a stretch to argue that
one of the court's roles in democracy is to police terms of con-
tracts for public policy concerns, including unconscionable terms.
One could even go so far as to argue that judicial supervision of
adhesion contracts, and perhaps form contracts more generally, is
essential to provide such contracts (which often lack the "consent"
central to the democratic character of traditional contracts) with
democratic legitimacy.21
Like relational contract theory, democratic citizenship theory
also confronts the problems of capacity and basic entitlements.
While it emphasizes the consent power of citizens, it also empha-
sizes the need for people to attain a level where that consent is
meaningful. People need a certain minimum of education and
other goods to be able to participate (since citizenship theories are,
after all, participatory theories) in the society, both as a political
actor and as one capable of acting meaningfully across the range of
spheres of social interaction. From the perspective of contract law,
democratic theory will emphasize the minimum capacities that
people need to contract and to make contract obligations enforce-
able. Thus it would view the doctrines that constitute the fringes
of neoclassical law - duress, unconscionability, mistake - as fun-
damental to the validity of state enforcement of the contract obli-
gations. The state would have a higher obligation to police bar-
gains to ensure that consent was given. Democratic citizenship
theory would also emphasize the need to combine these contract
law principles with affirmative support for education and welfare
programs. If Reconstruction teaches us anything, it teaches that
contract alone is a desert and that we need social welfare for peo-
ple to flourish as citizens and as contracting parties.
B. Consumer Adhesion Contracts
To illustrate these democratic concepts of consent and capac-
ity, consider the consumer form contract, a.k.a. the adhesion con-
2tract. Democratic theory would seek to ensure that the consumer
211 David Slawson made this significant point over three decades ago. Slawson, supra note
4, at 533-36.
212 A distinction can usefully be drawn between consumer form contracts generally and a
subset of such contracts which constitute adhesion contracts. The standard form contract may
lack consent to all of its terms, yet not be adhesive, if the consumer has a reasonable opportunity
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has the capacity to consent, and so would police such agreements
from some version - probably a strong one - of the unconscion-
ability doctrine.213 However, as Macneil and others have observed,
the standard form agreement is essential to the functioning of the
modern, bureaucratized economy.1 4 Thus, the law needs to ac-
count for the enforceability of such agreements in some way. I
think relational contract theory is less capable of answering this
problem than democratic theory, because democratic theory pro-
vides the external context for interpreting the form contracts. Re-
lational theory enables us to see that the consumer is likely con-
senting to something, albeit not the predrafted forms. Relational
contract theory begs for a relational standard to apply, yet con-
sumer transactions cannot legitimately rely on trade customs or
other sources of commercial relational norms, since the consumer
is not within this community, at least not in a way to have any in-
fluence on, or tacit agreement with, the norms. What the consumer
has agreed to, in fact, is a broader concept of reasonable terms, the
type of analysis applied in the reasonable expectations doctrine of• • 21?
the Ur-law of form contracting, insurance. Indeed, the impor-
tance of this question has been magnified recently in the debates
over revision of Article 2 of the U.C.C., where drafters engaged in
a battle royale over consumer protection issues, including the ap-
to know about and choose other sellers with different contract terms. Under this view adhesion
contracts are those for which the consumer has no choice of contracting with other sellers under
different terms. For instance, all automobile manufacturers might use the same warranty dis-
claimer. See generally Slawson, supra note 4, at 539-61. I use adhesion in a broader sense to
include contract terms which the seller cannot reasonably expect the buyer to review, since in
such cases it matters not at all if there are other term options in the market. See Rakoff, supra
note 154, at 1226-29 (arguing that consumers do not, and cannot be expected to, read form
terms). For Rakoff's far more extensive typology of contracts of adhesion, see id. at 1177.
2 13 See infra pp. 56-63 for discussion of unconscionability.
214 "[N]o one can honestly say that consumers ought to read [long standard form contracts
because] ... if consumers actually did such a foolish thing the modem economy would come to
a screeching halt." Macneil, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 7, at 5-6; see also Kessler, supra
note 209, at 631-32; Slawson, supra note 4, at 530. But see Rakoff, supra note 154, at 1197-
1245 (arguing, iter alia, that contracts of adhesion are not essential to the economy and that the
standardization they achieve can be obtained just as well, and more fairly, through regulation).
215 On the reasonable expectations doctrine, see generally Roger C. Henderson, The For-
mulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside Insur-
ance Law, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 69 (1998). Professor Henderson's article is part of an excellent
symposium issue on the reasonable expectations doctrine. On how enforcing the reasonable
expectations of the consumer supplies democratic legitimacy to the form contract, see Slawson,
supra note 4, at 539-44; cf Braucher, Regulatory Role, supra note 10, at 726 (advocating pref-
erence for contract interpretations that implement reasonable consumer standards, at least in the
absence of clearly expressed contract terms to the contrary). But cf Jean Braucher, The Afterlife
of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 65 (1995) [hereinafter Braucher, Afterlife] (emphasizing the
weakness of case-by-case reasonableness determinations in policing unconscionable terms in
consumer contracts and favoring legislative and administrative blanket restrictions on terms).
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plication of a reasonable expectations doctrine to consumer form
contracts.216
The basic idea that the consumer's "consent" might encom-
pass reasonable terms itself is entirely consistent with relational
approaches; the current U.C.C.'s unconscionability provision
21 7
was arguably created to provide such a test.218 The problem with
the traditional unconscionability approach, however, lies precisely
in its failure to credit the law as an instrument of democratic citi-
zenship. This point is most apparent in the assumption that courts,
not juries, decide the question of unconscionability. The U.C.C.
itself expressly directs questions of unconscionability to the
court.2 19  This is so despite the recognition by the drafters that
questions of unconscionability often require factual analysis of
context. 220 This desire to view unconscionability as a question of
law may stem in part from the historic origins of unconscionability
in equity, where courts applied a "shock the conscience" test ap-
pealing to the court's conscience.2 Being an equitable doctrine,
the jury played no role. Yet unconscionability is also closely con-
nected to a standard of reasonableness, and it is this reasonable-
ness standard which Robert Hillman, for instance, has recently
emphasized in advocating unconscionability as an important safe-
guard in the law of consumer form contracts.222 If one pushes un-
conscionability toward the reasonableness test, however, it be-
comes far from clear that juries should not be involved in a wide
216 See Henderson, supra note 215, at 80-106. On the demise of provisions protecting con-
sumers in form contracting situations in the Article 2 revision process, see Richard E. Speidel,
Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS. L.J. 607, 614-17 (2001).
Current and prior drafts of revisions of Article 2 can be obtained at the official website for The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model
Acts at http://www.law.upenn.edubll/ulc/ulc.htm (last modified Aug. 22, 2003).
217 U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002).
211 See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 748 (2002) (ex-
ploring how the reasonableness test was part of the vision of Karl Llewellyn, who drafted the
U.C.C. provision). For an example of Llewellyn's view, see KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (Aspen Publishers 1960). For a critique of Lle-
wellyn's approach, see Rakoff, supra note 154, at 1198-1206.
219 "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract ....
U.C.C. § 2-302(l) (2002) (emphasis supplied).
220 "When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may
be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination."
U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2002).
221 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 1I, at 303-08.
222 Hillman, supra note 218, at 750 (arguing against Todd Rakoffs anti-form contract
position and in favor of Llewellyn's idea that a consumer or others can exercise a blanket assent




223range of determinations of the validity of particular terms. Tra-
ditional understandings of reasonableness, both in tort and con-
224tract, place it in the province of juries. Indeed, reasonableness is
often seen as the means by which the jury constructs a communal
judgment: the reasonable person is "a personification of a commu-
nity ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social
judgment., 225
This point is most obviously relevant to procedural uncon-
scionability issues, where the claim is a defect in the process of
contracting. 226  Such disputes are often ones of fact particular to
the transaction, such as whether the seller hid relevant terms or
shaded the legal meaning or effect of written terms. To the extent
the jury is viewed in its role as factfinder, this approach makes
sense.
227
The stronger claim, however, is that even in cases of substan-
tive unconscionability there is a significant role for the jury, and it
is here that democratic citizenship can have some impact. Ques-
tions of substantive unconscionability involve the validity of par-
ticular contract terms, whether they are oppressive, overly one-
sided, or otherwise serve the interests of the drafter so greatly that
the other party could not have meant to agree to them. Democratic
citizenship might well support a greater role for the jury in sifting
through the facts of a case to determine if the particular term -
e.g., an arbitration clause - is substantively unconscionable. Thus,
pre-dispute contractual arbitration agreements where the arbitra-
tion fee is $4000 might well be unconscionable to an average con-
sumer but not for an investment banker.228
223David Slawson recognized this problem in 1971 and noted that it could lead to a
"highly artificial" division of facts and law to try to parse out the province of the judge and jury
in unconscionability claims. See Slawson, supra note 4, at 564-65. Oddly Slawson, who in this
article constructed a democratic legitimacy theory for adhesion contracts, did not address the
question I posit below: Isn't the jury the proper democratic body for deciding unconscionabil-
ity?
224 In contract, for instance, the reasonableness of an interpretation of the contract language
is a question of fact for the jury, unless of course the judge decides that no reasonable jury could
interpret it as one of the parties suggests. See MURRAY, supra note I1, at 462.
225 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., West
1984).226The classic exposition of the two-pronged view of unconscionability (procedural and
substantive) was by Arthur Leff. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionabiliv and the Code - The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). The classic case read by almost all law
students is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
227 The fact/law distinction often devolves into a particular/general distinction for the pur-
pose of determining jury questions. See William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the
Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WiS. L. REV. 931, 932-
33.
228See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding
an arbitration clause in a consumer form contract to be unconscionable to the extent it required
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More importantly, the jury can also be viewed as the best de-
mocratic body to express social norms about contract. 229  Uncon-
scionability is nothing if not a claim that a contract or contract
term violates accepted social norms, either the norms of a particu-
lar trade or broader social norms. Indeed, one can think of the
citizen jury as analogous to the merchant jury for the purpose of
implementing consumer trade norms. From a democratic perspec-
tive it makes more sense to ask a jury for an expression of social
norms than to ask a court, at least where the norm is more broadly
based, such as in consumer transactions.
Substantive unconscionability doctrine - whether imple-
mented by juries or the courts - also has the potential to promote
democratic citizenship in a way that changes the norms and self-
images of citizens themselves. As mentioned above in the discus-
sion of anti-discrimination laws, when the state speaks law it also
constitutes community.23° Jeffrey Harrison has argued that a
broadly applied unconscionability doctrine may in fact inform con-
sumers that they need not accept oppressive terms simply because
they feel powerless. 231 Knowing that oppressive terms are unen-
forceable may lead consumers to value themselves more, and to
take seriously their status as equal citizens. This point should be
made cautiously, however, because the particular theory of democ-
ratic citizenship put forth here also credits the norms of the market
within their own sphere of market relations. The key question,
costly arbitration proceedings). Brower presents exactly the type of case which should cause
one to question the necessity of having the judge decide substantive unconscionability. In that
case, the appellate court determined that a term requiring arbitration costing the consumer ap-
proximately $2000 would be unconscionable but one costing $500 might not, as a matter of law.
Id. at 574-75. This is absurd. If the consumer has a low income and minimal assets, the fee for
arbitration could be $500 or $50,000 - it's prohibitive either way. Either the unconscionability
of the cost of arbitration is unreasonable under the particular embedded facts of the case and is
best determined by a jury, or there needs to be a fee limitation structure for consumer dispute
resolution, which is best done by legislatures or agencies.
229 On the connections between juries and democracy, see Vikram David Amar, Jury Ser-
vice as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995) (discussing
various forms of jury selection discrimination and their troubling affect on American democ-
racy); Lisa Kern Griffin, "The Image We See Is Our Own": Defending the Jury's Territory at
the Heart of the Democratic Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332 (1996) (book review) (arguing that
although the jury system lies at the heart of our democratic system, it has lost much of its moral
authority in the popular legal culture). For a fascinating analysis of the importance of jury ser-
vice to democratic citizenship in the context of gender discrimination, see LINDA K. KERBER,
No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
128-220 (1998).
230 See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
231 Harrison, supra note 169, at 493-500. The opposite may also be true: The unconscion-
ability doctrine, to the extent it emphasizes the lower education and bargaining capacity of the
consumer, encourages consumers and (perhaps more troublingly) their attorneys to characterize
the consumer-plaintiff as deficient and powerless. It is hard to know which signal - empower-
ment or powerlessness - dominates.
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therefore, is not simply whether any contract term is unconscion-
able, but (1) whether the term itself impinges on other democrati-
cally significant spheres, such as the right to public dispute resolu-
tion and juries, or the vindication of important statutory rights, and
(2) whether the contract relationship itself involves issues of de-
mocratic citizenship, as would employment relations.
One might respond that parties, and in particular sellers of
mass consumer products, need more certainty regarding the en-
forceability of contract terms than is possible if juries decide many
of the substantive unconscionability claims. Gateway would rather
know that its arbitration provision is invalid as a matter of law
than have 40% of juries say it is valid; they need reliability and
accurate cost estimates. Furthermore, consumers benefit from re-
duced costs of decisions made as a matter of law, even if those de-
cisions go against the consumer.
While this may be accurate, it is also true that in a jury-based
regime the court still retains the controlling ability to determine
that no reasonable jury could decide that the particular clause is or
is not conscionable. Yet, even if we concede that the decision
about substantive unconscionability should lie with the court, the
court should still be expected to rely on democratically based
means of determining substantive unconscionability: statute and
administrative regulation. Where the particular term is made
unlawful by the legislature or administrative agency, the court has
an obvious statement of unconscionability to follow. But the court
can also rely on analogous situations to aid its legal review of a
contract term, conducting what is essentially a public policy analy-
sis of the terms based on legislative and administrative actions in
related areas of law. On the question of arbitration, for instance,
the court would ultimately want to balance the democratically ex-
pressed interests in favor of arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act with the democratically expressed interests in having dis-
putes decided by public bodies, particularly if the dispute involves
an issue deemed by the legislature as important for public values
and for citizenship itself.2
32
232 Thus the court's determination of the "conscionability" of an arbitration agreement (or
its decision to send the issue to the jury) should properly be influenced by whether the issues
subject to arbitration are of public or citizenship import, such as violations of the civil rights
laws. There is a very strong democratic citizenship claim for holding that disputes regarding
racial and gender discrimination should not be subject to pre-dispute arbitration. See, e.g.,
Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 780 (2002) (arguing that there is a "clear public interest" in seeing
federal rights such as anti-discrimination adjudicated in a public forum and not being subject to
pre-dispute arbitration). As Knapp notes, the Supreme Court seems unmoved by this observa-
tion. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a
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Democratic citizenship theory would also be sympathetic to
arguments made by some scholars that consumer adhesion con-
,,233tracts amount to a form of "private legislation. The seller uses
sophisticated informational techniques and complex drafting proc-
esses, involving marketing departments, law departments, etc., to
create a set of legal rules beneficial to it in a wide range of transac-
tions; the seller legislates, often furtively. 234  Moreover, as Todd
Rakoff has observed, the form contract terms often reflect the legal
gamesmanship of the drafting firm's law department, and not a
business analysis of the underlying transaction-type; "[t]here is no
basis for presuming that the form incorporates any relevant social
wisdom., 235 The consensual relation for such private legislation is
not between the seller and buyer, since the buyer plays no role in
drafting and is often oblivious to the term at issue, but between the
seller and some party acting as proxy for the buyer. Yet because
contract law usually enforces the form terms, the "proxy" for the
buyer is by default the seller itself. As Friederich Kessler stated,
"[f]reedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract
and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian
,,236forms. Democratic citizenship suggests that in the face of this
privatized authoritarianism sanctioned by contract law, the state is
in fact in the most legitimate position to act as the buyer's proxy
and engage in this private legislation, at least to the extent disputes
arise and the state is asked to enforce the contract. 237 Because ad-
claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be subject to pre-dispute
arbitration agreement).
211 Slawson, supra note 4, at 538; Macaulay, Floating, supra note 8, at 780. Stewart
Macaulay's more extensive views on how rules, codes, and norms of non-state organizations
function as private legislation can be found in Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1987). Some aspects of
this latter work of Macaulay overlap with my theory presented here. In particular Macaulay
notes the need to study the full range of interaction among the state, private associations and
relational networks, and the individual. Id. at 503. He also understands citizenship as having
meaning because of its interaction with (and realization through) networks of social relations
such as friends, families, fellow workers, etc., which is similar to my idea that democratic citi-
zenship need be understood through the multiple spheres of relations. Id. at 478. In this piece,
however, Macaulay sees the state as one of many "governments" or social structures which
legislate behavior. Id. at 446-54. By contrast, I emphasize the unique role of government in
implementing and fostering democratic citizenship.
234 Firms use market research to determine how a contract term adverse to the consumer
can be included in materials sent to consumers in a way most likely to evade the consumer's
attention while still complying with the law of contract formation and modification. See, e.g.,
Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing AT&T's market studies
used to determine what disclaimer language would be most likely to discourage consumers from
reading other terms which eliminated class action rights and required arbitration).
235 Rakoff, supra note 154, at 1205-06.
236 Kessler, supra note 209, at 640.
2371 do not deny that the consumer's consent is also reflected in the market, which the
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hesion contracts are fundamentally authoritarian, they do not pro-
mote a plural, civic freedom envisioned by democratic citizen-
ship.z3 8 Rather than privileging private legislation, the court can
privilege public legislation, and, in its absence, public regulation
through the court and jury.
Relational contract theory would likely also support much of
the above critique.239 It could not, however, explain why the state
should have such an affirmative rule, nor would it be able to guide
courts as effectively. Democratic citizenship theory addresses the
omission while also relying on a relational method. The consumer,
under this view, is acting in a dual capacity as economic actor and
citizen. The consumer may consent in a general sense to certain
notice provisions for timely asserting warranty claims. There are
accepted norms of the seller-consumer relation that should be sup-
ported. But the consumer neither has the capacity to, nor actually
does, consent to arbitration in a distant forum and the relinquish-
ment of basic rights. The consumer lacks capacity because nobody
can understand such provisions without a lawyer - they are drafted
and marketed to be hidden - and the consumer in fact does not be-
lieve that she has given up such rights. Democratic theory would,
I believe, support this reasonableness interpretation of the contract
that would effectuate a societal consumer norm.24 ° It would privi-
lege consumer legislation and administrative regulation as a means
of policing such bargains, 24 and it would also support having the
democratic dispute resolution body, the jury, decide these disputes
in a public forum.
seller presumably takes into account in framing and implementing its terms. This can justify the
use of the terms in the market, and democratic citizenship theory would permit this power in its
own sphere. However, when the seller seeks to use state authority to enforce its term (rather
than just relying on the force of the market and the good will or consumerist obedience of the
buyer), the seller must subject itself to the state's role as representative of the public norms and
as proxy for the consumer consent. Ultimately this view would allow for some space for mar-
ket-only regulation of terms that lie between terms which are regulatorily prohibited and the
mere use of which by a firm could result in sanction, and terms that courts would refuse to en-
force.
238 Rakoff, supra note 154, at 1240-41.
239 See, e.g., id. (setting forth Rakoffs analysis of contracts of adhesion). Rakoff s ap-
proach is relational to the extent he analyzes the function of contracts of adhesion in mediating
the relationship among individuals, firms, and institutions. See id. at 1215-16, 1220-29.240Cf Braucher, Regulatory Role, supra note 10, at 732-38 (supporting goals of both effi-
ciency and decency supplemented by community standards).
241 See Braucher, Afterlife, supra note 215, at 65 ("[Tlhe ultimate normative judgment
about reasonableness - in view of the facts - may be most appropriately legislative. Given the
many burdens on Congress, however, administrative regulation is more feasible.").
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CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS
I want to conclude by also mentioning some ways in which re-
lational contract theory can improve and support the democratic
citizenship principles I have discussed.242 First, the insight and
work of relational theorists supports the particular type of social
pluralism of democratic theory advocated by Michael Walzer and
others. The possibility of private cooperation and the capacity for
contracting parties to develop, with some frequency, cooperative
norms indicates that Walzer was probably right to champion the
private (non-state) creation of spheres of good valuation and to
attempt to expand the focus of political theory beyond the realm of
politics. More fundamentally, to the extent that Macneil is correct
that there are essential norms of contract, and that the act of con-
tracting and the ensuing contractual relations are themselves essen-
tial for organic solidarity, it becomes vital that theories of the de-
mocratic state themselves include space for such contract norms.
Second, the knowledge of the norms internal to each sphere
will often provide essential guidance to the implementation of any
democratic norms. While at times there will be irreconcilable ten-
sions between democratic principles and norms internal to particu-
lar non-political relations, such as in my discriminatory employ-
ment example, frequently the tension between the internal norms
and democratic norms will reveal the more effective means of im-
plementation. Internalizing affirmative action programs and anti-
harassment programs in ways consistent with a particular em-
ployer's management styles and with the customs of the particular
business or trade is more likely to be effective than heavy-handed
and long-term state enforcement. The democratic crusader who
refuses to account for the overlapping subcultural norms of par-
ticular embedded social relations will find himself beset with hos-
tility and avoidance.
Third, relational contract theory may also provide a method-
ology for implementing some democratic values through contract
law. An example of such methodology can be seen in David Slaw-
242 In addition to the points made in the text, relational contract theory could also refocus
how we think of the Constitution and constitutional law. Gidon Gottlieb has suggested that the
Constitution is itself relational, and that constitutional law is often dependant on the acts and
practices of constitutional actors and their relations. Gottlieb, supra note 2 1, at 589-91. The
implications of such an approach are too broad to address here. One possibility is that such a
theory would support the movement away from juricentric constitutionalism. See, e.g., Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions
on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 17-30 (2003) (noticing that the Court has resisted con-
gressional enforcement of civil rights in an effort to maintain the Court's role as the "ultimate
expositor" at the expense of Congress's political interpretations of the Constitution).
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son's now classic treatment of standard form contracting. 243 Slaw-
son recognized both the necessity of form contracting 244 (although
he was reluctant to describe the interaction as contracting)245 and
the need to regulate it.246 Slawson's solution is particularly sig-
nificant for our purposes: he advocated that courts evaluate form
contracts according to "nonauthoritative" standards, including
standards particular to the transactional context.247 On one level,
his approach seems eminently relational, since he argued that the
"[s]tandards appropriate for reviewing the terms under which the
products or services of an industry are sold would of course have
to be developed from consideration of the purposes of the industry
and its products or services. '248 The norms inherent in a particular
industry should influence a court; a court's evaluation of a suicide
exclusion in a life insurance policy should account for the purpose
249
of life insurance and the risk analysis of suicide coverage. 4 On
another level, however, Slawson's approach pushes relational con-
tract theory beyond itself and towards democratic theory, for in
analyzing the purposes served by an industry standard, Slawson
would have the court consider the industry standard's relationship
to the public interest.250 The court's overriding standard in evalu-
ating form contract terms is the public interest, not the norms ema-
nating from the particular industry or contract relation. The key
point, then, is that relational contract theory provides guidance for
determining the inherent values or norms of particular industries or
relationships, and that those values themselves can be tested
against ideas of democratic citizenship and connections to "public
interest."
Macneil's attention to the norms essential to contracting also
suggests that the state needs to consider how its own imposition of
non-contractual norms, even democratic norms as critical as non-
discrimination, may have unintended effects on the underlying
solidarity and reciprocity of the relationship being regulated. Will
24 Slawson, supra note 4.
244 Id. at 532.
245 "[Plractically no standard forms, at least as they are customarily used in consumer
transactions, are contracts." Id. at 544.
2461d. at 539-61.
247 See, e.g., id. at 544 ("Reasonable expectations are determined not by what the form re-
cites but by the actual context in which the transaction is conducted.").
248 Id. at 559; see also Kessler, supra note 209, at 637 ("In dealing with standardized con-
tracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately expect by
way of services according to the enterpriser's 'calling', and to what extent the stronger party
disappointed reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation.").
249 Slawson, supra note 4, at 559; see also id. at 560 (arguing that business history pro-
vides important evidence of relevant standards which the court should use).
25) Id. at 534.
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the imposition of norms central to democratic citizenship ulti-
mately impede the other valuable norms of the employment rela-
tion? How can the state promote employment in a way that retains
the benefits of the employment relation for development of the
democratic self, yet also insures the implementation of democratic
norms and values within the relationship? 25' These questions re-
main ever-present for any theory that tries to implement democ-
ratic principles through contract law.
Finally, relational contract theorists provide a note of caution
in any theoretical project to improve contract or other social rela-
tions. Although much of Macneil's work has focused on develop-
ing the general contractual norms of relational contracting, a sig-
nificant yet under-appreciated aspect of his scholarship involves
the analysis of bureaucratic law. Macneil displays both the con-
viction that bureaucracy is inevitable in the modern world and the
deep fear of the dehumanizing power of bureaucracy. 252  Thus,
when he contemplates the use of state power to enforce noble ends,
such as anti-discrimination programs, he believes that the neces-
sary bureaucratization resulting from such imposition by the Le-
viathan-state will destroy the relational aspects of the enterprise
being regulated. According to Macneil, bureaucratization pro-
duces procedural regularity but also potentially destroys trust and
good faith.253  A relationship mediated by bureaucracy is not a
relationship of solidarity, and "bureaucracy in the service of
equality is a paradox," since bureaucracy necessarily implies
unequal power.254  This is a critical concern. Bureaucratically
controlled and imposed democratic norms may well cease to be
democratic and may well not lead to the development of the
democratic citizen and self. Macneil therefore reminds us that no
social policy can be implemented without loss. He also cautions
against any perfectionist social theory, and to the extent that
2.1 The fact that this theory of democratic citizenship concerns itself with the interaction
between the state and contract norms makes it at least plausibly consistent with Macneil's rela-
tional contract theory, since he only rejects theories (or "dogmas") which "insist on effectuating
supracontract norms, like equality and choice, to such a degree that essential common contract
norms are eroded too much .... Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 7, at 414.
252 See, e.g., Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 84; Macneil, Contracts of Adhesion, supra
note 7. While Macneil's analysis of bureaucracy is much more important than contract scholars
generally credit, his definition of bureaucracy, like his definition of contract and exchange rela-
tions, is overly broad. He defines modem bureaucracy as encompassing all activity; all people
are bureaucrats almost all the time. Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 84, at 905 n.20. We
ultimately will need a more precise definition and finer distinctions for such an analysis to be
helpful.
2." MACNEIL, NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 7, at 68.
2-11 Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra note 84, at 921. Macneil's vision of equality in this pas-
sage appears to be that of a simple equality rather than the complex equality advanced by Wal-
zer and advocated here.
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democratic citizenship bends toward perfectionism, Macneil's
caution should be raised.
One may still hope, however, that a theory of democratic citi-
zenship can partially address these concerns as well, and that by
being grounded in a theory of pluralism among social value con-
structs, such a theory may have the potential for minimizing these
adverse effects. A theory of the state sufficiently open to other
values may foster the flexibility to address Macneil's concerns.
Moreover, the fear of bureaucratization may be greatest in the case
of extensive state regulatory and administrative control; one can
hope that one of the roles of the courts in a democracy is to im-
plement democratic norms without creating vast bureaucracies. A
theory of democratic citizenship which appreciates the role of
court-centered contract law and even more importantly the role of
private contract relations beyond law might be able to avoid the
liberal impulse to become a bureaucratic Midas, turning everything
it touches into bureaucracy. Whether such an approach can suc-
ceed is another story, but given the already highly bureaucratized
nature of much of the contractual relations people engage in every
day, often bureaucratized by the private entities rather than the
state,255 it is probably worth the effort.
255 Employment with a large corporation, for instance, is far more likely to be bureaucratic
than an expression of solidarity, as Macneil has long recognized. Macneil, Bureaucracy, supra
note 84, at 917-18. Given the choice between private bureaucracy designed to maximize one
party's profits and public bureaucracy designed to maximize democratic values, the latter may
be justified.
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